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Abstract
This project analyzes two books of contemporary creative nonfiction: The
Argonauts by Maggie Nelson (2015) and Time Is the Thing a Body Moves Through by T
Fleischmann (2019). Both writers centrally deal with queerness in their texts as a concept
that is ineffable, or unable to be fully explained in words. I explain how to think about
queerness as ineffable through the work of queer theorists Judith Butler and José Esteban
Muñoz. In their books, Nelson and Fleischmann recognize that language is insufficient or
even harmful in maintaining the ineffability of queerness, which poses a significant
paradox for their works that are made up of language. I argue that it is in their use of the
queer formal elements of non-linearity, blank space, and an incomplete integration of
outside texts that Nelson and Fleischmann are able write about queerness beyond the use
of language and therefore maintain the concept’s ineffability. I acknowledge that both
writers are invested in affirming the realness of queer bodies and extending that sense of
realness to others and argue that they do so successfully through their use of queer form.
By engaging queer theory and conducting a formal analysis of The Argonauts and Time, I
show how queer form can make possible writing about queer content.
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Introduction
I began my voracious reading of creative nonfiction the same summer that I
realized my own queerness. Looking back, it’s clear to me that this was not a
coincidence; I was searching for real lives after which to model my suddenly much more
confusing own. I was drawn to books that were formally hard to define, like the
queerness that I was beginning to try and fail to articulate. I read books like Sheila Heti’s
How Should a Person Be? which blurred the line between fiction and nonfiction, The
Folded Clock by Heidi Julavits which was structured non-linearly, and The Lonely City
by Olivia Laing that combines research, history, and memoir into a collection of essays.
These books were formally queer in the way that they refused normative memoir
structure and evaded strict categorization. However, they had nothing actually to do, on a
content level, with queerness.
It not until my lyric essay class in my first year of college that I read a work of
creative nonfiction that was not only queer in form, but also content, when my professor
assigned Gloria Anzaldúa’s remarkable Borderlands/La Frontera (1987). Borderlands
profoundly expanded my ideas about queerness and language and awareness of the
possibilities in queering form. Anzaldúa writes about queer sexual orientation and gender
identity (and much more) through a genre-bending form that incorporates a hybrid
mixture of poetry and nonfiction. She draws a link between writing and queerness when
she says, “Being a writer feels very much like being a Chicana, or being queer—a lot of
squirming, coming up against all sorts of walls. Or its opposite: nothing defined or
definite, a boundless, floating state of limbo where I kick my heels, brood, percolate,
hibernate and wait for something to happen” (94). The queer form of Borderlands reflects
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the queerness Anzaldúa describes. As she goes back and forth between somewhat
straightforward prose and poetry in the text, she renders a sensation of coming up against
walls and then floating in a boundless state. Here was a writer who was writing about
experiences of nonnormativity within a nonnormative form.
After reading Borderlands, I searched for other works of creative nonfiction that
dealt with queer sexual orientation and gender identity within a form that reflected the
nonnormativity of the content. I searched for books that treated queerness as something
more than a static identity marker, as something boundless and necessarily indefinable,
since every time I tried to define the queerness I was experiencing, I felt at a loss for the
precise words. I found this type of work in Maggie Nelson’s The Argonauts (2015) and T
Fleischmann’s Time Is the Thing a Body Moves Through (2019), the texts with which this
paper is centrally concerned. In their works of creative nonfiction, Nelson and
Fleischmann deal with queerness as a slippery, ineffable concept and write about it in
what I argue is queer form.
Even though Nelson and Fleischmann emphasize the necessarily indefinability of
queerness in The Argonauts and Time, I want to clarify my usages of the term which still
maintain the ambiguity of the concept. I have already used queerness in two different
ways: to describe sexual orientation and gender identity and also as a way to describe
nonnormativity more broadly, in this case as pertaining to literary form. I dive more
deeply into the nuances between Nelson and Fleischmann’s uses of the term queer in
chapter one, but first I will clarify my usages with a quote from Sara Ahmed’s 2006
article “Orientations: Toward a Queer Phenomenology” in which she holds space for both
meanings of queer and articulates the distinction well. Ahmed writes, “I have used
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[queer] to describe what is oblique or off-line or just plain wonky. I have also used the
term to describe nonstraight sexual practices—in particular lesbianism—as a form of
social and sexual contact. I think it is important to retain both meanings of the word
queer, which after all are historically related even if irreducible to each other” (565). I
read queerness in Nelson and Fleischmann’s books both in the nonnormative sexual
practices and gender identities they write about as well as the way they resist normative
literary forms.
Retaining these two meanings is queer itself, something which Ahmed goes on to
explain when she writes:
“To make things queer is certainly to disturb the order of things. The effects of
such disturbance are uneven, given that the world is already organized around
certain forms of living—certain times, spaces, and directions. It is important to
make the oblique angles of queer do this work, even if it risks placing different
kinds of queer effects alongside each other” (Ahmed 565).
The queer content of The Argonauts and Time disturbs the order of normative bodies and
relationships and the queer form disturbs normative forms. In keeping different types of
queerness alongside each other in this project, I allow for an expansiveness of the term
that is queer itself in its ambiguity.
In this introduction, I will provide summaries of the two texts, my thesis
statement addressing Nelson and Fleischmann’s use of queer form to write about
queerness, my methodology, and a brief outline of the structure of my project to set up
my following close readings of the two texts.
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Summaries
The Argonauts (Graywolf Press, 2015) is American poet, nonfiction writer, and
scholar Maggie Nelson’s most recent book. The Argonauts garnered significant attention,
becoming a New York Times bestseller and winning the 2016 National Book Critics
Circle Award in Criticism. In The Argonauts, Nelson writes about queerness in a way that
is simultaneously expansive and precise, rooted in her own experiences and extensive
reading. The Argonauts is an amalgamation of deeply personal anecdotes, quotes from
philosophers and theorists, and commentary on art, told in the form of short blocks of
text, ranging in size from a single line to half a page. The names peppered through the
margins credit whom she quotes and give the reader a sense of the breadth of Nelson’s
cultural and literary touchstones.
The book opens with a graphic description of queer sex between Nelson and her
genderfluid partner Harry, whom is a reoccurring presence in the book, establishing the
centrality of Harry and queerness to the story. This opening makes clear the highly
personal nature of The Argonauts, which Nelson also emphasizes when she at times
addresses Harry in the second person throughout the book. Harry’s comment to Nelson,
recorded in The Argonauts, that she has not yet written about “the queer part of her life”
serves as the impetus for the book. The Argonauts deals with queerness in many different
ways—it is about Harry’s transition, top surgery, and experience on testosterone,
Nelson’s pregnancy (an experience she frames as queer), the gender dynamics in their
relationship and growing family, queer political issues, and the work of queer theorists.
The personal elements are not told in linear order in but instead interwoven with the other
elements of the book, creating a queer form that I will analyze in this study.
4

Nelson is self-reflexive about her role as a writer throughout The Argonauts,
referring to her previous works, speaking engagements, and writing process. She relates
these anecdotes back to the central themes of non-normative gender and sexuality.
Nelson constantly poses questions, ones which she rarely directly answers but deeply
involves through writing about her own experiences and quoting the works of others.
Nelson is clearly interested in the contradictions, tensions, and complications that
queerness depends upon and explores these both through concrete examples, whether
political, personal, or artistic, and complex theory.
I first picked up Time Is the Thing a Body Moves Through in a bookstore because
it reminded me of The Argonauts, similarly devoid of chapters, nonnormative in form,
and centrally about queer bodies and the relationships between them. Published four
years after The Argonauts by another small independent publisher, Time Is the Thing a
Body Moves Through (Coffee House Press, 2019) is contemporary American writer and
editor T Fleischmann’s second book. They have also published both critical and creative
work in publications including The Los Angeles Review of Books, Fourth Genre, and Gulf
Coast. Fleischmann is a nonfiction editor at DIAGRAM and a contributing editor at Essay
Daily. According to the book’s cover, Time (which is how I will refer to it throughout my
study) is “an essay,” a genre category that Fleischmann expansively uses to mean
formally nonnormative creative nonfiction as I will explain further in my third chapter.
Compared to The Argonauts, Time has more variety in form, with its typical prose
paragraphs interrupted by lineated sections, a 15-page long historical story, and five
incomplete, floating paragraphs that conclude the book. Each of these sections is distinct,
differing from one another both in form and content.
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The prose paragraphs in Time read as memoir, in which Fleischmann recounts
their travels, relationships, and personal experiences. The lineated sections are primarily
about Fleischmann’s fascination with the late 20th-century visual artist Felix GonzalezTorres, who created minimalist works largely about his queerness and relationship to his
partner Ross during the 1980s and 1990s AIDS crisis. Fleischmann also writes about their
queer relationship with a person named Simon in these lineated sections. The historical
story is a true account of an 18th -century genderqueer person called “the Publick
Universal Friend.” The five floating paragraphs at the end focus on the subject of ice (as
in, the frozen substance), an obsession of Fleischmann’s that appears elsewhere in the
book. But throughout all of these sections is a consistent thread: a desire to represent
nonnormative, queer bodies and the relationships between them. I will draw out these
connections throughout my study.
I was drawn to The Argonauts and Time in part because they both treat queerness
expansively. In their texts, authors explicitly express the insufficiency and even the risk
of language to fully articulate queerness, something I kept coming up against in the limits
of language to articulate my own queerness as well. The writers’ recognition of the
insufficiency of language particularly compelled me because it raises a paradox, as they
both use language to write their books about queerness. While both authors recognize this
paradox, neither explicitly explains how they deal with it. This is where my intervention
lies. I argue that in their attempts to write about queerness in The Argonauts and Time,
Nelson and Fleischmann recognize the limits of language but write anyway, relying on
the queer formal elements of collage—in particular non-linearity, blank space, and the
incomplete integration of outside texts—to write indirectly about queerness. Refusing
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genre categories and queering the formal elements of their texts also allows the writers to
implicitly represent the queer bodies they write about through the form of their books.
Methodology
After I recognized that Nelson and Fleischmann explicitly express the limits of
language for writing about queerness in their books made up of language, I asked: what
else are texts made up of, besides language, that could allow them to write about the
concept anyway? Form is often placed opposite to content, or language, in literary
studies, so in this study, I analyze formal elements of The Argonauts and Time to argue
that they allow Nelson and Fleischmann to write about queerness beyond the use of
language. I treat content as related to form, but distinct from it. In her 2015 book Forms,
Caroline Levine explains that she wants to see the gap between content and form
dissolve, writing that when we broaden our definitions of form, “The traditionally
troubling gap between the form of the literary text and its content and context dissolves”
(2). I am also interested in this gap between content and form that Levine identifies, but I
don’t want to dissolve it. Rather, I want to traverse it, keeping the categories distinct but
recognizing their influence on one another. It is useful to keep form and content separate,
and it is also useful and very fruitful to see how they inform one another. In the cases of
The Argonauts and Time, the form is able to do things that the content, or language, is
not—that is, writing about queerness without attempting to capture its ineffability.
Therefore, it is important to keep these categories separate to recognize what they do
differently, even though they are related.
Nelson articulates the relationship between content and form in an interview on
her writing process, saying, “How the piece eventually takes form is very important, but
7

form for me comes out of the imperatives of content” (“The ‘f-word’: fragment and the
futility of genre classification”). Nelson expresses that form and content are linked, with
the form of a text emerging from what the content demands. A central imperative of
content in The Argonauts and Time is writing about queerness without capturing its
ineffability in language. As Nelson recognizes that the words are not “good enough” to
write about queerness and Fleischmann expresses a desire to keep their gender and sex
life “uninscribed” by language, both writers manipulate form to write about queerness
indirectly, slant, or queerly. They both use the collage form and its elements of nonlinearity, blank space, and incomplete integration of outside sources to do so. I analyze
these elements as queer and emerging out of content’s demands to write about queerness
without capturing its ineffability.
I analyze The Argonauts and Time side-by-side, interweaving my readings of the
books in each chapter. In many ways, these books seem quite similar—they are both
works of creative nonfiction that deal with queerness by using the queer formal elements
of non-linearity, blank space, and the integration of outside texts. However, Nelson and
Fleischmann each use these three formal elements in distinctly different ways. Nelson
and Fleischmann’s ideas about queerness differ somewhat, which the formal differences
in part illuminate. These differences in ideas about queerness make clear what these
writers see as the necessary ineffability and slipperiness of the concept. By comparing
them directly, rather than devoting individual chapters to each, the differences in the
authors’ formal decisions and treatments of queerness become more apparent, drawing
out subtleties that I did not notice when initially analyzing them individually.
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In order to explain Nelson and Fleischmann’s ideas about queerness that make
necessary the queering of formal elements, I rely on the work of queer theorists Judith
Butler and José Esteban Muñoz. I use Butler and Muñoz’s theories to explain that Nelson
and Fleischmann treat queerness as ineffable, or unable to be captured in language. Both
theorists write about queerness beyond an identity marker for one to claim, and as an
expansive concept that necessarily cannot be entirely defined or pinned down, which is
how Nelson and Fleischmann do as well. I draw on both Butler’s 1993 article “Critically
Queer” and the introduction to her 1997 book Excitable Speech. In “Critically Queer,”
Butler writes about the necessity of keeping “queerness” an ever-evolving term that does
not mark a strict identity categorization. In Excitable Speech, she writes about the power
and limits of language more generally and while she doesn’t explicitly write about
queerness, I apply her ideas about the injurious potential of language on the ineffable to
queerness, as she describes the concept as necessarily unable to be captured in “Critically
Queer.” I also rely on Muñoz’s 2009 book Cruising Utopia to think about queerness as
something that cannot be captured in the present because the concept must always be out
of reach. I use Muñoz’s ideas to show how Nelson and Fleischmann write about
queerness as a concept necessarily out of reach.
In both their content and form, I read The Argonauts and Time as works of low
theory, as proposed by Jack Halberstam in his book The Queer Art of Failure (2011), in
order to illuminate the indirectness, unanswered questions, and amalgamation of sources
within them and the ways these elements are emphasized through form. Halberstam
describes low theory as “One of these modes of transmission that revels in the detours,
twists, and turns through knowing and confusion, and that seeks not to explain but to
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involve” (15). Both The Argonauts and Time seek to involve queerness but not fully
explain it, as that would be antithetical to the ineffability of the concept.
They attempt to do so both through the content of their books, but also the form.
Low theory is a product of both content and form, as Halberstam also describes it as
“knowledge practices that refuse both the form and the content of traditional canons”
which “may lead to unbounded form of speculation, modes of thinking that ally not with
rigor and order but with inspiration and unpredictability” (Halberstam 10). Both The
Argonauts and Time refuse traditional genre categories, which I will explain further in
chapter three. The Argonauts is marketed as a “memoir/criticism” but departs from both
categories in both its form and content. Time is called “an essay” but Fleischmann uses
this category to actually resist genre. As I am relying on Ahmed’s idea that “to make
things queer is certainly to disturb the order of things,” low theory is particularly queer
(565). As Halberstam explains, it is “a counterhegemonic form of theorizing, the
theorization of alternatives within an undisciplined zone of knowledge production,”
therefore disturbing the normative order of theorizing (Halberstam 18). By eschewing
genre categories and resisting normative forms, The Argonauts and Time are works of
low theory and thus queer texts.
Reading Time and The Argonauts as low theory encourages both my clarity and
confusion about the books to exist together. As I read The Argonauts and Time,
interviews with the authors, and queer and literary theory, thinking through questions of
queerness and form, I had days when I was unbelievably excited about what I was finding
followed by days of being absolutely mystified by all of the contradictions. Fleischmann
and Nelson seek not to explain queerness in their books, because doing so defeats what
10

they see as the purpose of the concept. Rather, they involve it, asking questions and
posing ideas, allowing for both moments of clarity and confusion. They do so through the
“detours, twists, and turns” of their formally non-linear and genre-indefinable books.
Reading The Argonauts and Time as low theory is a particularly queer way of reading if
we treat queerness as a concept unable to be captured and defined, as Nelson and
Fleischmann do. Low theory reminds me that is the irresolution that make these books
queer.
While I don’t necessarily claim my project to be a work of low theory because I
try not to go off on detours and have structured it like a fairly typical research paper, I
kept Halberstam’s ideas in mind when I was doing research and drew from a wide variety
of sources. For example, I structured my project around lines of a poem by the 19th century poet Emily Dickinson, included a quote from one of my favorite contemporary
creative writers Valeria Luiselli, drew on visual art criticism, and included quotes from
interviews published on websites. This allowed me to engage The Argonauts and Time
more fully and akin to how they engage queerness: from a variety of angles and with an
open, curious mind.
I have structured my three chapters around the first two lines of a poem by Emily
Dickinson: “Tell all the truth but tell it slant — / Success in Circuit Lies,” as a tribute to
my love for her work. Since most people in my life were shocked that I wasn’t writing
my I.S. on her, this is my way of still including her in this project. The countless times
I’ve seen this poem quoted it’s been interpreted as meaning that we should not tell the
entire truth, allowing for fictionalization or things left out. I think this interpretation has
merit, but a more interesting reading, and one that I am founding the structure of paper
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on, is that it is referring to form. Dickinson begins the poem by advising us to tell the
truth “slant.” The Emily Dickinson Lexicon, which scholars of her work use to get a better
sense of how the poet would have understood the words that she uses in her poetry,
defines “slant” as “indirectly” (“slant,” adv.). I read Dickinson not as advising us on what
kind of truth to tell, but rather how we should tell the truth—that is, in what form. I argue
that Nelson and Fleischmann write “slant,” or indirectly, about queerness through what I
read as queer form, with the help of Sara Ahmed from her article “Orientations.” In
“Orientations,” Ahmed poses the idea that a slant orientation and indirection is
specifically queer. She writes that a nonalignment with the normative is “slant” and that
this produces a queer effect. In chapter two, I argue that the formal elements of The
Argonauts and Time are queer and thus allow the writers to write about queerness
indirectly and beyond the use of language without attempting to capture the concept’s
ineffability.
Like interpretations of the poem “Tell all the truth,” writing and scholarship on
creative nonfiction has also largely explored questions of the truth-telling and content of
texts rather than their form. In their introduction to Bending Genre, Margot Singer and
Nicole Walker write that “unfortunately, the fracas over the ethics of nonfiction has
sidelined important questions of literary form” (1). To get a sense of this, I took a cursory
look at collections of essays on creative nonfiction. Much of their central concerns are
related to truth-telling and ethics, like Singer and Walker suggest. For example, Jen Hirt
and Tina Mitchell, editors of Kept Secret: The Half-Truth in Nonfiction (2017), explain
that the impetus for their collection comes from the fact that “With so many flat-out
fraudulent memoirs getting attention, there is a need for transparency behind the process
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of how we tell our truths” (xvii). And in the introduction to the anthology We Might As
Well Call It The Lyric Essay (2015), John D’Agata remembers that when he wrote a book
that “suggested that some kind of essays don’t always need to be verifiably accurate,” it
proved to be much more controversial than he expected, as he writes that he was
“shocked by some people’s reactions” (7). He describes people’s responses, writing, “If
it’s called ‘nonfiction,’ many colleagues insisted, then it needs to report the facts as
accurately as the news” (8). Of course, truth is what purportedly serves as the foundation
for nonfiction, but it is easy to get sidetracked in debating the truth of a piece and ignore
analyzing its form. My project shows that interesting discoveries that can be made when
we turn our focus to the form of works of creative nonfiction.
Chapters
In chapter one, “Tell all the truth,” I show that Nelson and Fleischmann’s central
concern in their books is writing about queerness. This chapter focuses on the content of
the books—specifically, the writers’ frustrations and struggles in attempting to write
about queerness. I use the theory of Butler and Muñoz to frame how Nelson and
Fleischmann understand queerness as an ineffable concept, rather than solely as a fixed
identity term. Nelson and Fleischmann are explicitly averse to using “queer” as a way to
identify themselves since it codifies the concept which they, alongside Butler and Muñoz,
believe is antithetical queerness. They still engage the concept throughout their texts,
however, in terms of politics, nonnormative bodies and relationships, and something that
can never be precisely pinned down. Even though Nelson and Fleischmann write
extensively about queerness, they both recognize the limits of language in attempting to
write about it. I argue that this raises a significant challenge for both writers who use
13

language to write their books. I conclude chapter one with the question: how are Nelson
and Fleischmann able to write about queerness without fully relying on language and
attempting to capture the concept’s ineffability?
In chapter two, “But tell it slant —,” I argue that Nelson and Fleischmann use
“slant” formal elements to write indirectly about queerness without. Using Ahmed’s
argument from “Orientations,” I argue that writing “slant” is writing in a queer form. I
read The Argonauts and Time as examples of collage form. Collage form’s elements of
non-linearity, blank space, and incomplete integration of outside texts are particularly
queer in the way they disrupt normative form. In this chapter, I provide a close reading of
both writers’ uses of each of these formal elements. I include images of pages to provide
a visual for the formal elements. I show how Nelson and Fleischmann manipulate form in
different ways but to the same end of representing queerness beyond the use of language.
In chapter three, “Success in Circuit Lies,” I recognize that both Nelson and
Fleischmann express an investment in representing the “realness” of queer bodily
experience in their books. I return to the work of Butler who argues that sometimes
language can be the tool for affirming one’s realness, especially for queer bodies. I note
that this raises another paradox for Nelson and Fleischmann who wrestle with the
insufficiency of language in expressing queerness. I introduce writing on queer abstract
art to think about the possibilities in form for invoking the queer body beyond the use of
language. Ultimately in this chapter, I argue that is through their queer form that refuses
genre categories and is non-linear that Nelson and Fleischmann are able to invoke the
bodies they want to affirm. Finally, I recognize that Nelson and Fleischmann’s
investments in realness are coupled with a desire to extend that sense of realness to others
14

that is an act of queer collectivity. I again turn to the formal elements of particularly nonlinearity and the incomplete integration of outside texts that I analyzed in chapter two to
show how they invite the reader into their texts and achieve their goal of extending a
queer, collective sense of realness to others.
This project underscores the importance of examining the role that formal
elements play in a text. Nelson and Fleischmann are able to write about queerness beyond
the use of language and thus deal with a significant paradox for their books by queering
the formal elements of their texts. By paying attention to the form, an underexamined
element in analyses of creative nonfiction, we can more deeply appreciate the
complexities of the content. For The Argonauts and Time, queer form is necessary in
order to write about what the texts are centrally concerned with—queerness as an
ineffable concept unable to be fully dealt with in language.

15

Chapter I: “Tell all the truth”
One of my favorite things about creative nonfiction is that it doesn’t have to be
clearly about anything in particular, or it can be about many things at once. However, in
this chapter, “Tell all the truth,” I attend to what both Maggie Nelson and T Fleischmann
suggest their books to centrally be about, the truth that they attempt to tell in their works
of creative nonfiction. In both cases, the content does not compromise what I love about
creative nonfiction, but rather supports it. Both Nelson and Fleischmann write centrally
about queerness, a concept that they frame as ineffable, or impossible to capture in
language. Thus, what their books are about is thus still somewhat ambiguous and unable
to be precisely articulated.
Nelson is explicit about queerness being central to The Argonauts, whereas
Fleischmann avoids using the term to describe what they write about in Time. However, I
argue that Fleischmann still writes about queerness as it is articulated by queer theorists
Judith Butler and José Esteban Muñoz who describe queerness as unable to be pinned
down or captured. I use the theory of Butler and Muñoz to frame both Nelson and
Fleischmann’s treatments of queerness as ineffable. Both theorists express the political
implications of keeping queerness out of reach, which Nelson and Fleischmann address
as well. Finally, I argue that keeping queerness ineffable presents a challenge for people
working in language as Nelson and Fleischmann are. In their books, both writers
recognize the insufficiency of language to write about queerness, but they nonetheless
write these books that are centrally about the concept. I see this as a significant paradox
for their books and conclude with the question I will attempt to answer in chapter two:
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How, then, do Nelson and Fleischmann write these books about queerness without
attempting to capture the concept’s ineffability?
The Centrality of Queerness
Queerness is central to both The Argonauts and Time. Nelson presents The
Argonauts as her attempt to respond to her partner Harry’s accusation that “You’ve
written about all the parts of your life except this, except the queer part” (32). The “queer
part” of Nelson’s life, as it turns out, is many parts: her relationship to Harry, but also her
pregnancy, her philosophical and theoretical readings, her analyses of art, and her
politics. Nelson positions The Argonauts as the text which responses to Harry’s claim and
deals with all of these queer parts of her life.
Fleischmann is less explicit about the central focus of Time, but it seems to be
queerness according to what they write at the end of their book. They write that this story
is “a story of bodies that are different, of people who fuck up and make each other happy
and then die” (144). Throughout Time, they write about nonnormative relationships and
bodies in a way that I read as queer according to Muñoz’s theory.
For both Nelson and Fleischmann, queerness is about nonnormative bodies and
the relationships between them rather than individual identity. Queer theorists Butler and
Muñoz also frame queerness as markedly indicating things beyond identity. According to
Butler and Muñoz, queerness must be held ineffable and unable to be captured by
language in the present in order to maintain this broad meaning beyond identity.
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Queerness Beyond Identity
The term “queer” began to be reclaimed in the early 1990s to describe not
specifically a gender or sexual identity but nonnormativity more broadly. As David Eng,
Jack Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz outline in their introduction to What’s Queer
about Queer Studies Now? (2005):
“Around 1990, queer emerged into public consciousness. It was a term that
challenged the normalizing mechanisms of state power to name its sexual
subjects: male or female, married or single, heterosexual or homosexual, natural
or perverse. Given its commitment to interrogating the social processes that not
only produced and recognized but also normalized and sustained identity, the
political promise of the term resided specifically in its broad critique of multiple
social antagonisms, including race, gender, class, nationality, and religion, in
addition to sexuality” (1).
Queerness as imagined in the 1990s was expansive and used to interrogate social process
rather than be solely claimed as an identity. Looking back on the 1990s in her 2004
article “Transgender Studies: Queer Theory’s Evil Twin,” Susan Stryker describes the
“new concept of an antiessentialist, postidentitarian, strategically fluid ‘queerness’”
(213). This iteration of queerness was necessarily not tied to identity and had evershifting meaning.
It was during this time that Judith Butler wrote her article “Critically Queer”
(1993) in which she argues that the ineffability of queerness must be maintained for the
concept to maintain its usefulness. Butler writes:
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“If the term ‘queer’ is to be a site of collective contestation, the point of departure
for a set of historical reflections and future-oriented imagining, it will have to
remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only
redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of urgent and
expanding political purposes” (19).
Butler explains that using “queer” as an identity category can risk compromising the
queerness that she outlines, writing that it is “impossible to sustain that kind of mastery
over the trajectory of those categories within discourse. This is not an argument against
using identity categories, but it is a reminder of the risk that attends every such use” (19).
For Butler, queerness must be able to constantly change and develop, which identity
categories risk hindering.
Nelson and Fleischmann both avoid using queerness as an identity term in order
to maintain its usage for historical reflection and future-oriented political purposes that
Butler refers to. Nelson elucidates her decision to not use “queer” as an identifier for
herself in an interview with Fleischmann on the website Essay Daily. When Fleischmann
asks Nelson, “In terms of gender and sexuality, do you think of yourself as a queer writer,
or of your work as somehow queer?” Nelson responds, “I’m very invested in queer
literary genealogy/genealogies, which I would be very happy for my work to be seen as a
part of, more so than I care about the (self)-designation ‘queer writer,’ as the latter seems
to beg biographical questions and introduce codified notions of what qualifies as queer to
which I’ve always felt allergic” (“Queer Essay Interviews: Maggie Nelson”). Though
Nelson sees value in using the word “queer” to describe such things as literary
genealogies that are historically related to others and greater than the individual, the uses
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that Butler recommends, she believes that the word becomes codified when used to
indicate individual identity. This codification, Nelson seems to suggest, is antithetical to
what queerness should be, in accordance with queer theory’s original framing of the
concept from the 1990s. To Nelson and these theorists, queerness is useful when it is
being used to describe nonnormativity broadly, but not strictly identity. In The
Argonauts, Nelson wants to avoid codifying queerness, which means that she tries to
avoid directly capturing what the concept means.
In Time, Fleischmann suggests that the ineffability and postidentarian nature of
queerness that Butler and the other theorists outline first drew them to the concept.
Fleischmann explains their aversion to the term when it is used to describe identity when
they write, “Queerness, when I first encountered the idea, aspired to a life away from
identity categories, eroticizing what lies outside them, but today it seems the word often
points to a reification of identity, to new rules” (65). Fleischmann explicitly decides to
not use queer as an identity term for themselves, writing in Time, “I am not queer these
days” (23). For Fleischmann, identifying as queer would reify queerness, which is
antithetical to their understanding of the concept as something ineffable. Unlike Nelson,
Fleischmann does not use the term “queerness” to describe anything other than identity
throughout their book, but I will argue that they are often still writing about queerness as
imagined by Butler and particularly Muñoz.
In his 2009 book Cruising Utopia, Muñoz expands upon Butler’s argument that
queerness should be kept “never fully owned” in the present with his theory of the
“horizon” as the location of queerness. He also argues that queerness is not a static
category that one can embody, writing that queerness is “not yet here” and that “we have
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never been queer” right on the very first page of his book which speaks to Nelson and
Fleischmann’s aversions to using “queer” as an identity marker (1). Muñoz describes
queerness as something that is necessarily always out of reach, arguing that “if queerness
is to have any value whatsoever, it must be viewed as being visible only in the horizon”
(11). Queerness, in Muñoz’s terms, cannot be pinned down and captured in the present.
Muñoz situates queerness as something that we are always moving towards but
can never quite reach, as he writes, “we must dream and enact new and better pleasures,
other ways of being in the world, and ultimately new worlds. Queerness is a longing that
propels us onward” (1). In Cruising Utopia, Muñoz is ultimately offering a theory of
queer futurity as he proposes that queerness is “primarily about futurity and hope” (11).
Muñoz describes his theory of queer futurity as being “attentive to the past for the
purposes of critiquing a present” (18). Muñoz thus ascribes a political usefulness to queer
futurity in its ability to critique the present order of things. As I will explain shortly,
Nelson and Fleischmann explore the political usefulness of keeping queerness as
something unable to be captured and situated in the future. While an analysis of the role
of queer futurity in The Argonauts and Time is worth another entire I.S. project,
recognizing that both writers write about queerness as something that we move towards
but can never quite capture is most helpful for this study. The idea of queer futurity will
be present throughout this project but is not currently my central concern.
“You never get there, you just keep going”
In line with Butler and Muñoz, Nelson and Fleischmann treat queerness as
something which cannot be captured in the present. While Nelson provides specific
examples for things that she deems as “queer,” she uses the term capaciously which
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makes it unable to fully be captured. Fleischmann writes about queerness in queer
theory’s terms as something that is out of reach but avoids using the term explicitly. By
writing about queerness as a concept that we can move towards but can never quite reach,
Nelson and Fleischmann speak to Butler and Muñoz’s theories of the concept and treat
queerness as necessarily ineffable.
The closest we get to a direct statement of Nelson’s understanding of queerness is
in her presentation of the work of queer theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Sedgwick’s
description of queerness is how Nelson also deals with the concept throughout The
Argonauts. Nelson explains Sedgwick’s work by writing:
“Sedgwick wanted to make way for ‘queer’ to hold all kinds of resistances and
fracturings and mismatches that have little or nothing to do with sexual
orientation. ‘Queer is a continuing moment, movement, motive—recurring,
eddying, troublant,’ she wrote…At the same time, Sedgwick argued that ‘given
the historical and contemporary force of the prohibitions against every same-sex
sexual expression, for anyone to disavow those meanings, or to displace them
from the term [queer]’s definitional center, would be to dematerialize any
possibility of queerness itself’” (29).
Sedgwick simultaneously wants queerness to have little to do with sexual orientation and
to be centered around it. Queerness has significant meaning rooted in sexual expression
and orientation that must not be lost, but it can also be used applied more expansively to
nonnormativity that is not related to sexuality. This very breadth of the concept is queer
in its allowance of paradox. Nelson finds Sedgwick’s ideas compelling as she comments,
“In other words, she wanted it both ways. There is much to be learned from wanting
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something both ways” (29). By framing queerness as “a continuing movement,”
Sedgwick speaks to Muñoz’s language and articulates the concept as something that is
constantly moving but never quite able to be captured, a framing that Nelson embraces.
In the quote from “Orientations” that I used in my introd uction, Ahmed describes the
importance of allowing for both uses of “queer” when she writes, “Although we risk
losing the specificity of queer as a commitment to a life of sexual deviation, we would
also sustain the significance of deviation in what makes queer lives queer” (565). It is
queer to allow for paradox and contradiction, which these multiple uses of queerness do.
In The Argonauts, Nelson herself uses the concept of queerness in the two ways
Sedgwick outlines. For example, when Nelson writes about a 2012 photo exhibition by
A. L. Steiner called Puppies and Babies featuring photographs of the artist’s friends
holding, unsurprisingly, puppies and babies, she argues that some of the subjects “may
not identify as queer, but it doesn’t matter. The installation queers them,” not as a
presentation of sexual orientation, but rather through nonnormativity (72). In this
example, Nelson uses queerness to refer more widely to nonnormativity rather than
merely identity, “redeploying, twisting, and queering” the term, to use Butler’s phrasing.
However, later in the book, Nelson writes that “queerness is about disturbing normative
sexual assumptions and practices,” maintaining the centrality of sexual orientation to
queerness, even though she also applies it to things, like Steiner’s exhibition, that have
little do with it (111). Nelson’s ambivalence towards queerness makes her usage of the
concept impossible to precisely pin down. Queerness in The Argonauts cannot be fully
contained or defined, “not fully owned in the present” as Butler recommends it to be, but
rather something on “the horizon” that Muñoz orients us towards.
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Fleischmann’s treatment of queerness is different from Nelson’s because they
largely avoid using the term “queer” in Time, only mentioning it as a codified marker of
identity that they do not use for themselves. Though they do not explicitly explain this
decision, I understand it in the context of their introduction to the 2014 interview
collection Body Forms. Fleischmann asks:
“If queerness is exciting for resisting identity, and if the essay is exciting because
of its hybridity, its way of slipping among genres, would the natural conclusion of
these lines of thought be the extinction of both? Could I just not identity—a
gender, a sexuality, a genre, a body of a self or a text?” (vi-vii).
I will return to their paralleling of the essay and queerness in chapter three, but here I
want to focus on what they are saying about queerness. The queerness that they are
interested in resists describing identity, in line with Butler and Muñoz’s framings of the
concept. However, while Fleischmann expects that queerness would subsequently go
“extinct” in its resistance to identity, Butler argues that it can be constantly reimagined
and Muñoz that it is always just out of reach but constantly something we are moving
towards. In Time, Fleischmann implies that they think queerness has gone extinct by only
mentioning the term when describing identity, but I read the ways that they write about
nonnormative bodies, relationships, and politics as queer in particularly Muñoz’s
theorizing of the concept as always out of reach and on the horizon. I argue that
Fleischmann still writes about queerness even though they do not indicate it as such.
For example, at the end of Time, Fleischmann uses language that resonates closely
with Muñoz’s theory of queerness, as they vaguely begin a paragraph by writing,
“Anyway, you never get there, you just keep going” (143). This idea of constantly
24

moving towards something but never quite getting there is in line with Muñoz’s framing
of queerness as something always out of reach and in the future. I read the “there” that
Fleischmann refers to as queerness since a paragraph later they write:
“I’m always catching myself in a daydream, / where Simon and I are holding
hands, and going exactly / where we should be. / Because that’s what I dream of,
places like that. / Where Simon likes holding hands / and everyone recognizes our
collective beauty, / a thing that is here now but also very far from what we know”
(144).
The “there” that Fleischmann imagines constantly moving towards is this idyllic queer
relationship with Simon in the future. By framing this queer relationship as something
very far away in the future that they are moving towards, this scene resonates with
Muñoz’s theory of queerness always being on the horizon.
One reason why Butler and Muñoz argue it is important to maintain queerness as
something ineffable and out of reach is because doing so maintains the political potential
of the concept, something that Nelson and Fleischmann both engage in their texts as well.
I refer to politics to mean actions that have material consequences on lived experiences,
based on how the theorists and Nelson and Fleischmann write about politics. Nelson
writes about queer politics from a more removed, theoretical standpoint, whereas
Fleischmann writes about the ways that they themselves engage in queer politics.
However, both writers suggest that keeping queerness as something unable to be captured
gives it the political power that Muñoz and Butler describe the concept as having.
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Butler writes that keeping queerness as something never owned in the present
allows the concept to work “in the direction of urgent and expanding political purposes”
(“Critically Queer” 19). Muñoz provides more precise language for what the political
purpose of queerness is. He writes that keeping queerness as untouched “potentially
staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology and the degradation of politics
brought about by representations of queerness in contemporary popular culture” (22).
Neoliberalism and degraded politics are things of the present, which Muñoz believes a
queer orientation toward the future can imagine us beyond. Neoliberalism’s lack of
political conviction is, according to Muñoz, in opposition to the inherent political strength
of queerness. Nelson and Fleischmann both implicitly express anti-neoliberal politics.
Queer theorist Lisa Duggan explains what the “neoliberal ideology and the
degradation of politics” that Muñoz believes queerness works against in her 2002 article
“The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism.” Duggan defines
neoliberalism as “a kind of nonpolitics—a way of being reasonable and of promoting
universally desirable forms of economic expansion and democratic government globally”
(177). More specifically, neoliberalism is “procorporate, ‘free market,’ anti-‘big
government’ rhetoric shaping U.S. policy and dominating international financial
institutions since the early 1980s” which is nonpolitical in its “way of being reasonable
and of promoting universally desirable forms of economic expansion and democratic
government globally” (177). It is the dominating state of the present order of things,
which Muñoz wants queerness to work against in its propelling towards a better future.
While neoliberalism is embraced by many identity groups, Duggan is primarily
interested in its perpetuation by gay constituencies and culture forming “the new
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homonormativity,” which she defines as “a politics that does not contest dominant
heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while
promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized,
depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption” (179). Duggan
argues that gay people who perpetuate heteronormative institutions rather than critique
them constitute this homonormativity. Two major heteronormative institutions that are
upheld by homonormativity, according to Duggan, are marriage and the military, both of
which Nelson and Fleischmann wrestle with in their books, in addition to other forms of
domination that queerness can work politically against if kept ineffable and within Butler
and Muñoz’s terms.
Nelson writes that queerness has political potential in opposition to
homonormative institutions. However, she also recognizes that this potential power is
constantly threatened. Nelson emphasizes the complexity of the relationship of queerness
to state institutions in the significant length of her sentence when she writes:
“There’s something truly strange about living in a historical moment in which the
conservative anxiety and despair about queers bringing down civilization and its
institutions (marriage, most notably) is met by the anxiety and despair so many
queers feel about the failure or incapacity of queerness to bring down civilization
and its institutions, and their frustration with the assimilationist, unthinkingly
neoliberal bent of the mainstream GLBTQ+ movement, which has spent fine coin
begging entrance into two historically repressive structures: marriage and the
military” (26).
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Nelson keeps the “GLBTQ+ movement” separate from “the queers,” claiming that the
former is assimilationist and neoliberal and critiqued by the latter. The GLBTQ+
movement promotes the homonormativity that Duggan writes about and that Muñoz and
Butler warn against. Nelson recognizes the challenges that queerness faces in attempting
to take down homonormative, neoliberal institutions, but by keeping these two groups
distinct, Nelson suggests that queerness is still “not here,” as per Muñoz. Despite the
challenge of taking down these institutions, Nelson still sees value in queerness, adding,
“This is not a devaluation of queerness. It is a reminder: if we want to do more than claw
our way into repressive structures, we have our work cut out for us” (26). Nelson believes
that queerness has political power, but also that this power has to be maintained through
hard, collective work as suggested by the first-person collective use of “we.”
In Time, Fleischmann writes about their investment in the potential of queerness
to take down state institutions. They are more direct and radical in their politics than
Nelson and provide examples for what the political queerness that Nelson alludes to
might look like in action. Though they do not explicitly describe their politics as queer, I
argue that they are through Muñoz’s terms. Their anti-state stance and actions read as
particularly queer when they write:
“The police state wants me dead to make sure their children don’t end up like me,
so I guess every time I fuck and I’m happy and I do what I want I would like to
call that an anti-state action. The people I love alive—yes, we weaken the state.
But also every time after I have felt pleasure and played pool with a bunch of
transsexuals and smoked weed and then eaten a taco and gone home, when my
body is at its best, then I need to set myself to contributing to the coalition, which
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is already underway, which has kept me alive, the work of liberation being one of
the ceaseless things” (138).
I read Fleischmann’s “work of liberation” as queer liberation as it is related to their desire
to have sex with whom they want, feel pleasure with other people, and embrace their
nonnormative body. As I will explain further in chapter three, Fleischmann is invested in
affirming the realness of queer bodies in their work, which their emphasis on feeling
pleasure and sensory experience in this passage does. Fleischmann shows how feeling
bodily pleasure can be political for queer people whose bodies have been erased and
discriminated against by institutions including the state. The anti-state liberation they
write about is queer in Muñoz’s terms as Fleischmann describes it as “ceaseless,” like
Muñoz’s framing of queerness as something which constantly propels us forward towards
something better but necessarily must never quite reach it.
Language’s Relationship to the Ineffable
It is in their writing that Nelson and Fleischmann engage queerness. This presents
a paradox because language risks attempting to capture and injure the ineffability of
queerness that the writers suggest is necessary to maintain for their queer political beliefs.
In Excitable Speech, Judith Butler works with Toni Morrison’s 1993 Nobel Prize speech
to argue that language can be injurious when it tries to capture the meaning of the
ineffable. In her speech, Morrison said, “Language can never live up to life once and for
all. Nor should it. Language can never “pin down” slavery, genocide, war. Nor should it
yearn for the arrogance to be able to do so. Its force, its felicity is in its reach toward the
ineffable.” Morrison then puts this in different words, going on to state, “Language arcs
toward the place where meaning may lie,” but never quite reaches it. Butler responds to
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this by explaining that in its attempt to capture the ineffable, language can be violent. She
explains that the potential violence of language “consists in its effort to capture the
ineffable and, hence, to destroy it, to seize hold of that which must remain elusive for
language to operate as a living thing” (9). Morrison explains that language can never
quite capture the ineffable, and Butler takes this a step further by arguing that when
language tries to do so, it can have a violent effect.
While neither Morrison nor Butler writes specifically here about queerness as
something which language attempts to capture, I apply their ideas to the concept because
Nelson and Fleischmann treat it as necessarily ineffable as per Muñoz and Butler in
“Critically Queer.” Nelson and Fleischmann characterize the language that attempts to
capture queerness as more negative or uncomfortable than violent and injurious.
Morrison and Butler’s ideas, however, still offer a framework through which to
understand the negative potential of language on ineffable concepts such as queerness.
Nelson immediately begins The Argonauts by grappling with writing about
queerness through language. The first paragraph of the book depicts a sex scene with
Harry, setting up the book as about queerness. The second paragraph then moves
backwards in time, with Nelson explaining that “before we met, I had spent a lifetime
devoted to Wittgenstein’s idea that the inexpressible is contained—inexpressibly—in the
expressed” (3). Nelson is highly interested in the work of the early 20th century
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. She was particularly taken with his idea pertaining to
language that it is “possible to express truths that cannot in some sense or other be said”
(Lugg 248). Nelson simplifies Wittgenstein’s theory to the statement that “Words are
good enough,” meaning that language can, paradoxically, capture even that which is
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indescribable (3). This theory stands, notably, in contrast to Butler’s point that language
becomes violent and destroys what it is trying to explain when it attempts to capture the
inexpressible.
It is after entering a relationship with Harry that Nelson’s conviction that “words
are good enough” is challenged. Harry, Nelson writes, “spent a lifetime equally devoted
to the conviction that words are not good enough. Not only not good enough, but
corrosive to all that is good, all that is real, all that is flow” (4). Nelson explains why
Harry believes this, writing that he thinks that once something is named, “we can never
see it in the same way again,” which is something he knew “not from shunning language,
but from immersion in it, on the screen, in conversation, onstage, on the page” (4).
Harry’s opinion is closer to Butler’s, who argues that language is injurious to life when it
attempts to capture it, which it often does. The couple argues passionately over their
differing opinions on the impact of language because both Nelson and Harry believe that
language is significant.
Though she initially passionately resists Harry’s conviction, Nelson begins to see
the merit in it when she is tasked with booking airline reservations for herself and Harry
and negotiating with human resources—dealings that bring up questions about Harry’s
gender and the couple’s relationship. Nelson writes, “I’m ashamed for (or simply pissed
at) the person who keeps making all the wrong presumptions and has to be corrected, but
who can’t be corrected because the words are not good enough” to explain her
relationship to Harry and his gender identity (7). This comment is seemingly minor and
could be easily explained by the point that airlines and human resources departments,
particularly in the mid-2000s, don’t have the language for queerness. However, Nelson
31

uses these examples to illustrate that it was particularly in moments in her relationship
with Harry that her conviction that words are enough to describe the inexpressible—in
this case queerness—was challenged. She emphasizes the gravity of this realization by
repeating it and following with a free-standing line in italics: “How can the words not be
good enough?” (7). In the context of her queer relationship with Harry, Nelson realizes
that words are unable to entirely capture queerness which is in opposition to her
longstanding conviction that language can express even that which cannot be expressed.
Queerness, Nelson realizes, is something that language cannot and should not entirely
express in order to maintain the ineffability of the concept.
In Time, Fleischmann also recognizes the insufficiency of words to identify their
gender and sexuality, writing about the negative effect that identity categories for gender
and sexuality have had on them. Their current solution is to not identify with any words
at all, as they write:
“It took me years to consider the fact that I did not have to name my gender or
sexuality at all so that now I must always tell people that I am not something. I
insist on this absence more, even, than I used to insist on my identities, that I was
a bisexual boy, or genderqueer, or a queer, which was actually just unpleasant for
me in a lot of ways, come to realize” (64).
In attempting to find language to describe their gender and sexuality, Fleischmann
realized that their identity is ineffable, unable to be captured in words. Using language to
describe their gender and sexuality was unpleasant for them. Nelson addresses this
phenomenon as well when she writes, “Some people find pleasure in aligning themselves
with an identity…But there can also be a horror in doing so, not to mention an
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impossibility” (Nelson 14-15). Nelson’s use of the word “horror” recalls the injurious
power of language that Butler references, extending it to naming gender and sexuality.
Attempting to capture identity that is ineffable in language can be harmful, and also just
simply impossible, as it has been for Fleischmann when trying to describe their gender
and sexuality.
Fleischmann’s realization that words are not good enough to identify their gender
and sexuality causes them to want to avoid using any words at all to describe themselves.
To introduce their insistence upon describing their gender and sexual identity as an
absence, Fleischmann writes, “I want to leave my gender and my sex life uninscribed”
(64). They then describe their desire to avoid language when more generally expressing
themselves, again using the word “uninscribed,” when they write, “I would like to be
uninscribed by language, like an uninscribed piece of paper” (64). However, Fleischmann
uses language to write about their gender and sex life, and more generally about
themselves, in Time, posing a significant paradox for the book.
Significance
Nelson and Fleischmann’s realizations of the inadequacy of language to express
queerness poses significant challenges for writing books about queerness. Nelson’s
realization that “the words are not enough” is of such gravity to her because
Wittgenstein’s theory that the words are enough is, as she explains, “why I write, or how
I feel able to keep writing” (3). Wittgenstein’s theory allows Nelson to accept that all that
is inexpressible is contained in the expressed and therefore continue to write, as she
explains, “It doesn’t feed or exalt any angst one may feel about the incapacity to express,
in words, that which eludes them” (3). Based on Nelson’s reasoning for why she writes,
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the logical conclusion would be that she would no longer be able to write after realizing
that the inexpressible is not always contained in the expressed. This is particularly salient
for The Argonauts as queerness, and particularly Nelson’s relationship to Harry, ground
the text—which is what she realizes words are not good enough to describe. But she
writes the book anyway.
Fleischmann raises a similar paradox in Time: they write that they want to be
uninscribed by language, but they write this story about themselves using language. They
begin to recognize this contradiction when they write, “I am of course still written into
this whole structure, I can’t escape the language,” but then say, “that won’t stop me from
refusing it anyway” (Fleischmann 65). While they do explore the possibility of refusing
language in incorporating an entirely blank page in their book, which I analyze in my
next chapter, Time is largely proof that they haven’t refused language but are rather
actively engaging it.
In The Argonauts and Time, Nelson and Fleischmann want to maintain queerness
as an ineffable concept, as something that cannot entirely be captured in language, as
Butler and Muñoz describe it. In their texts, the writers recognize that language can
harmfully attempt to capture queerness and that it is insufficient for writing about the
concept. However, they both use language to write their books. This raises a question:
How do Nelson and Fleischmann write about queerness without capturing its ineffability
that they want to maintain?
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Chapter II: “But tell it slant—"
If writers are people who deal in language, and words are not enough or even
injurious for Maggie Nelson and T Fleischmann when writing about queerness, then how
do they still write their books about queerness? When Emily Dickinson advises us to “tell
all the truth” in her poem, she adds “but tell it slant.” As I mentioned in the introduction,
The Emily Dickinson Lexicon defines “slant” as “indirectly.” Nelson and Fleischmann
must write indirectly about queerness in order to avoid attempting to injuriously capture
the concept’s ineffability. Writing “slant,” or indirectly, is a specifically queer method, as
Sara Ahmed suggests in her “Orientations: Towards a Queer Phenomenology” (2013). In
this chapter, I rely on Ahmed’s argument that indirection, or a “slant” orientation, is
queer to show how Nelson and Fleischmann queer elements of form to write about
queerness beyond the use of language.
In this chapter, I argue that Nelson and Fleischmann use collage form in their
books, a form that I argue “slants” or “queers,” what they are trying to write about,
allowing the writers to write about queerness indirectly without capturing its ineffability.
In particular, I analyze three queer formal elements that Nelson and Fleischmann use:
non-linearity, blank space, and incomplete integration of outside texts. In comparing the
ways the writers manipulate these formal elements, I discover that they use the elements
in very different ways but for the same purpose of writing about queerness beyond the
use of language. Recognizing the differences in the writers’ use of formal elements
further illuminates the nuances in their thoughts on queerness that I outlined in chapter
one. Being aware of the writers’ differences in thought is important because it makes
clear that queerness is a concept that is necessarily expansive and unable to be fully
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captured, which is how both Nelson and Fleischmann frame it. For example, Nelson’s use
of blank space is consistent and regular, whereas Fleischmann’s is varied. This difference
reflects Nelson’s more explicit ideas about queerness relative to Fleischmann’s more
subtle ones. Both writers, however, use queer formal elements to communicate the
irresolution and indirectness necessary for writing about queerness while maintaining its
ineffability.
I read the queer formal elements of The Argonauts and Time as part of what
makes these texts works of Jack Halberstam’s low theory. In this chapter, I show how
Nelson and Fleischmann’s works “refuse the form” of “traditional canons,” as
Halberstam explains low theory does (10). The Argonauts is, according to the back cover,
marketed as a “memoir/criticism” and Time is called “an essay.” I will further explore the
way these books eschew these genre categories in the third chapter, but the labels serve as
a helpful starting point to understand the normative forms that the books divert from.
Memoirs are typically linear, chronologically following the story of a person’s life or a
period from it. Essays tend to follow the linear arc of an argument. Typical memoirs and
essays are written in prose with full paragraphs. Finally, if a memoir or essay includes
outside sources, they will be fully cited in a works cited or footnotes. The Argonauts and
Time divert from each of these normative formal elements, which makes them formally
queer. This refusal of traditional forms to produce low theory is queer in that it is “a
counterhegemonic form of theorizing, the theorization of alternatives within an
undisciplined zone of knowledge production” (Halberstam 18). Reading these texts as
low theory illuminates the queerness of their form and the writers’ ability to write about
queerness beyond the use of language and therefore without capturing its ineffability.
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Taking seriously the form of The Argonauts and Time is important because the
writers purposefully formal elements to make it possible to write the content of their
books. The writers’ use of queer form is a way of dealing with the paradox of continuing
to write about queerness without capturing its ineffability in language.
Queer Form
Sara Ahmed uses the word “slant” to describe a “queer,” or “oblique” orientation
in space, words that she uses interchangeably. To Ahmed, the slant is moving out of a
straight line, something which she argues is particularly queer, explaining, “What
intrigues me here is not so much how sex, gender, and sexual orientation can get out of
line, which they certainly can and do, but how they are kept in line, often through force,
such that any nonalignment produces a queer effect” (557). I read this forceful keepingin-line that Ahmed describes as normativity which any deviation from is queer. The queer
nonalignment with the normative to Ahmed is “slant,” or “oblique.” In The Argonauts
and Time, the queer formal elements of non-linearity, blank space, and the incomplete
integration of outside texts become unaligned with normative forms, which allows the
writers to express queerness beyond the use of language.
In “Queer Form: Aesthetics, Race, and the Violences of the Social,” Kadji Amin,
Amber Jamilla Musser, and Roy Pérez describe queer form as “the range of formal,
aesthetic, and sensuous strategies that make difference a little less knowable, visible, and
digestible,” emphasizing the “value of indirection, opacity, and withholding as queer
strategies” (235). In The Argonauts and Time, queer formal elements allow the writers to
write indirectly and incompletely about queerness in order to avoid capturing the
concept’s ineffability. Building on these writers and Ahmed, I read “slant” form as both
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unaligned with the normative and also embracing indirectness, which the formal elements
of The Argonauts and Time do. Nelson and Fleischmann write both books non-linearly,
deviating from the normative linear structure of memoirs. They use blank space between
paragraphs more frequently than normative texts, and Fleischmann uses it to lineate
sections that break out of a typical prose format. Both writers also integrate outside
sources in their texts but provide incomplete and nonnormative citations for them. In
queering the form of their texts through non-linearity, blank space, and incomplete
integration of outside texts in their collage forms, Nelson and Fleischmann emphasize the
unknowability necessary to represent queerness while maintaining its ineffability.
Collage Form
I read The Argonauts and Time as working in the collage form, which is
particularly conducive to low theory and the queering of form. While the origin of
collage lies in visual art, its invention attributed to the artists Pablo Picasso and Georges
Braque in the 20th century, the collage form has since been applied to literary and
musical forms as well (Cran 1). In her 2016 book Collage in Twentieth-Century Art,
Literature, and Culture, Rona Cran analyzes the work of a visual artist, a novelist, a poet,
and a songwriter all as collage which opens up the possibility of analyzing The Argonauts
and Time as works of collage as well, in the form of books.
Cran writes that the basic principle of the collage is “Experimentation with and
the linking of disparate phenomena: democratically, arbitrarily, and even unintentionally”
(Cran 4). The Argonauts and Time are constructed from disparate, non-linear chunks of
texts and excerpts from a wide variety of outside sources. These disparate pieces come
together to form a central characteristic of collage: the notion of a “present absence,” “of
38

figuring a figure that is never quite there” (Cran 4). In this way, collage is a way of
maintaining the ineffability of a concept. In collage, “the absence of the origin is
necessary, in that it facilitates or enables that from which it is absent, and reinforces the
concept that the artist is avoiding direct representation of an object or idea, but that this
object or idea exists nonetheless and is important in its unrepresentability” (Cran 4). In
The Argonauts and Time, that which is unrepresentable is queerness, and collage is the
form through which both Nelson and Fleischmann are able to write about the concept
without directly representing it through language.
In this chapter, I conduct a close reading of three formal elements that Nelson and
Fleischmann employ to create collage form to write indirectly about queerness: nonlinearity, blank space, and incomplete integration of outside texts. I argue that each of
these elements is queer in that it “slants,” or indirectly represents, queerness for which
words are insufficient to write about. I read non-linearity as queer temporality, blank
space as representing the holes necessary for writing about the ineffability of queerness,
and the incomplete integration of texts as raising questions that queerly remain
unanswered.
Non-linearity
Nelson and Fleischmann use the fragmented nature of the collage form to write
their books in a non-linear, queer temporality. Queer theorists have written extensively
about the queerness of non-linear temporality. In In A Queer Time and Place (2005),
Halberstam writes about queer time as counter to the heteronormative, progressive
timeline of life, explaining that “Queer uses of time and space develop, at least in part, in
opposition to the institutions of family, heterosexuality, and reproduction” (1). In
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“Orientations,” Ahmed further describes the “straight time” that Halberstam argues queer
time is an opposition to, writing that straight time “means imagining one’s futurity in
terms of reaching certain points along a life course. Such points accumulate, creating the
impression of a straight line. To follow such a line might be a way to become straight, by
not deviating at any point” (554). A deviation from this line would be a “slanting,” or
queering. By writing their books non-linearly, Nelson and Fleischmann queer the
temporality of their texts. The queer, non-linear form allows the writers to represent
queerness in their books beyond the use of language.
In Cruising Utopia, Muñoz argues that queerness deviates from the straight line
of a progressive, heteronormative life when he writes, “Queerness’s time is a stepping out
of the linearity of straight time” (25). I read non-linearity as an element of low theory,
since Halberstam describes low theory as a method of investigation “that revels in the
detours, twists, and turns through knowing and confusion, and that seeks not to explain
but to involve” (15). This desire to not fully explain things, to follow detours, and to step
out of the straight, progressive narrative, is a queer one that Nelson and Fleischmann use
in their books. The Argonauts is immediately and starkly non-linear, while Time’s nonlinearity is more subtle. By writing in non-linear forms, Nelson and Fleischmann create a
queer temporality and depict queerness beyond merely the use of words.
Many critics have noticed and written about the obvious non-linearity of The
Argonauts. The book opens with the time stamp of “October, 2007,” when Nelson and a
friend are having lunch, a scene which seamlessly flows into a sex scene with Harry that
is then immediately followed in the next paragraph with Nelson’s thoughts before she
met Harry (Nelson 3). While the opening timestamp initially orients the reader, it in fact
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serves as a point from which to deviate from a linear narrative as Nelson immediately
takes us out of October 2007. This non-linear temporality continues throughout the book.
For example, Nelson includes stories of her child Iggy as a baby before the scene of his
birth that appears at the very end of the book. She also writes about dating Harry long
after their marriage scene. While Nelson writes about starting a family and reproducing,
markers of “straight time,” the way she formally constructs this narrative in The
Argonauts is queer, placing these markers out of order to emphasize the queerness of her
experience.
In Time, the narrative told in the more typical prose form of the text is arguably
fairly linear, tracking Fleischmann’s travels and relationships as they unfold over time.
However, this narrative is frequently interrupted by the lineated sections of the text, the
personal narrative element of which take place in a period of time before the rest of the
book. Fleischman brings the readers back and forth from the present to the past over the
course of the book through these formal shifts, deviating from a straight, linear narrative.
This allows them to communicate the queerness of their experiences through the book’s
form.
By writing non-linearly, Nelson and Fleischmann represent queerness through the
temporal form of their books which is queer itself. According to Halberstam and Muñoz,
non-linearity is a form of queer temporality as it is in opposition to “straight time.” While
The Argonauts is marketed as memoiristic, a genre which typically follows the linear arc
of a life story, Nelson writes about her life experiences non-linearly, which queers the
text. Fleischmann also queers their text that is posited as an essay by deviating from what
would be expected to be a linear argument by inserting stories and scenes from the past in
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the typical prose text that dominates the book. In both books, the writers express
queerness through the non-linear temporality of their texts, using this formal element to
express queerness beyond the use of language.
Blank Space
Another striking formal element of both The Argonauts and Time is the writers’
capacious use of blank space. A formal element easily overlooked, blank space can add
significant meaning to a text, in addition to language. In her 2010 book of short essays
Sidewalks, Valeria Luiselli presents an alternative way of understanding of the writer, not
merely as someone who deals in words, but as “a person who distributes silences and
empty spaces” (78). A writer can deliberately manipulate the blank spaces in a text,
whether through lineation, breaks between sections, or entirely blank pages, to a variety
of different ends. Blank spaces can have the effect of creating pauses, representing the
unexplainable, or shaping the text into a particular formal shape, among many other uses,
all of which add to a reader’s understanding of a work beyond its words. Luiselli’s claim
addresses both content and form; the “silences” in a text are that which goes unsaid and
the “empty spaces” are the physical blank spots on the page.
Both Nelson and Fleischmann actively use blank space in their texts to indicate
the queerness which they cannot or do not want to write about solely in language. For
example, the chunks of text in The Argonauts are separated by blank spaces and there are
sections of Time that are lineated with blank space. The blank space in these texts
“slants” or queers the content by allowing for irresolution. Though Nelson and
Fleischmann use blank space to the same end—representing the ineffability of queerness
and writing queerly—formally, they construct it differently. Nelson’s blank spaces are
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regular and consistent, whereas Fleischmann’s are varied. Analyzing both Nelson and
Fleischmann’s uses of blank space illuminates their differences in the way they write
about queerness but also how the formal element works to the same end of maintaining
the concept’s ineffability.
Nelson and Fleischmann’s use of blank space in The Argonauts and Time is
another way these texts are works of low theory and thus able to allow for the irresolution
necessary to write about queerness. Halberstam writes that low theory allows for “more
undisciplined knowledge, more questions and fewer answers” (10). Blank space in The
Argonauts and Time emphasizes the unanswerability of questions about queerness and
therefore maintains the concept’s ineffability. In her essay “It Is What It Is,” Eula Biss
describes how blank space can do this, writing, “Holes in an essay, I tell my students,
flaws in the logic, contradictions, unanswered questions, loose associations may all be
necessary because of what they ultimately make possible” (197). Biss is referring to holes
in content, but these holes are reflected, in The Argonauts and Time, in formal blank
space. What do the holes in The Argonauts and Time make possible for the books? Both
formal holes—blank space that lacks words—and content holes—“flaws in logic”—in
The Argonauts and Time make it possible for their authors to write about queerness
without capturing its ineffability.
The entirety of The Argonauts is made up of chunks of writing that vary in length
from a single line to half a page. These blocks are separated from one another by blank
spaces which also vary in size throughout the book. Sometimes it is only a line’s worth of
space that separates two blocks of text, sometimes it is multiple lines worth. These spaces
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represent and allow for the holes in the language of writing about queerness and allow for
an indirectness that is necessary for writing in queer form.

On the first page of the book, when Nelson explains her devotion to
Wittgenstein’s idea that “Words are good enough,” she remarks, “It is idle to fault a net
for having holes, my encyclopedia notes” (3). It’s an odd moment; though there are no
full citations for any of the quotations in the book, it’s left particularly vague what
encyclopedia this is or what entry this quote is from. The quote itself is also fairly
opaque. By being placed at this point in the text, it immediately seems that Nelson is
trying to emphasize Wittgenstein’s point that even the inexpressible is contained in
language. She suggests that we shouldn’t regard language as “not enough” even if it
contains holes, with a focus on the net that continues to hold it together. Of course, a few
pages later, she comes to the realization that words are not always enough, but the
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quotation still holds. It is still idle to find fault in the holes because they are interesting
and necessary openings that also help to make the net.
The frequent and irregularly sized spaces between blocks of text in The
Argonauts serve as holes in both the form and content that are held together by a complex
and intricate net of ideas. In The Argonauts, Nelson is both literally and figuratively
making space for the realization that words are not enough, particularly in writing about
queerness. In the majority of her discussion about queerness, Nelson raises questions and
paradoxes that she does not set out to answer or resolve, making her text a work of low
theory in its allowance of irresolution. Nelson emphasizes the unanswerability of these
questions by inserting blank spaces after them. After a strange conversation at a dinner
party, she wonders a string of questions: “Was Harry a woman? Was I straight lady?
What did past relationships I’d had with ‘other women’ have in common with this one? ...
Why was this woman, whom I barely knew, talking to me like this? When would Harry
come back from the bathroom?” (8). Language is not enough to answer these questions
about queerness, which Nelson underscores by inserting blank spaces after them. She
involves these questions but does not explain them, like Halberstam explains low theory
does in that it “seeks not to explain but to involve” (15). The blank spaces are queer in
that they allow for irresolution and emphasize the unanswerability of the questions she
asks about queerness.
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Nelson makes this same formal move of inserting a blank space after asking
questions about queerness multiple other times. After researching the discriminatory
policy on queer students at a university at which she was asked to speak, she asks, “What
kind of ‘queer’ is this?” (28). And on thinking about her own creativity she writes, “I
wonder if one might be creative (or queer, or happy, or held) in spite of oneself” (103).
She inserts a blank space after both of these wonderings, leaving them unresolved and
emphasizing the irresolution necessary when asking questions about queerness. Nelson
addresses the usefulness and necessity of leaving discussions of queerness unresolved,
7asking, “How to explain, in a culture frantic for resolution, that sometimes the shit stays
messy?...How to explain that for some, or for some at some times, this irresolution is
OK—desirable even…?” (53). Like her other questions about queerness, Nelson does not
answer this one, maintaining the usefulness of irresolution. It is through her use of blank
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space after her questions that she emphasizes the necessary lack of answers when writing
about queerness and in a queer form.
The blank space in Time also queers, or slants, the form of the book, allowing
Fleischmann to write about queerness indirectly, but it is much more varied than the
blank space in The Argonauts. Fleischmann uses blank space in a variety of ways
including to lineate sections, as an entire page, and surrounding incomplete paragraphs.
All of these uses work to the same end of writing about queerness beyond the use of
language.
Fleischmann explicitly addresses the usefulness and queer potentiality they see in
blankness through their interest in the artwork “Untitled” (Passport) by the queer visual
artist Felix Gonzalez-Torres, a piece that I read as an example of a queer aesthetic form
(Figure 1).

Figure 1. Gonzalez-Torres, Felix. “Untitled” (Passport), 1991. Marieluise Hessel Collection on permanent
loan to the Center for Curatorial Studies, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.

The piece is a stack of blank white sheets of paper that are approximately 23 by 23
inches. Museum visitors are encouraged to take from the stack the piece is on display.
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Fleischmann’s use of “uninscribed” to describe how they want to keep their gender and
sex life ineffable comes from the language Gonzalez-Torres uses to describe “Untitled”
(Passport) in a 1992 letter to his gallerist in which the artist speaks to the usefulness in
blankness. Fleischmann quotes the letter in Time, when they write that Gonzalez-Torres
“reflected on another one of his takeaway pieces, a stack from which you can take an
‘uninscribed piece of paper’ which he called “Untitled” (Passport). In the letter, he
considers the blank paper a source of beautiful possibility, ‘an untouched feeling’” (63). I
read the blankness of this piece as queer in Muñoz’s terms. While Muñoz mentions
“Untitled” (Passport) as an example of a queer aesthetic form in Cruising Utopia, I wish
to use his theory to expand on his example.
On the first page of Cruising Utopia, Muñoz writes, “Queerness is that thing that
lets us feel that this world is not enough, that indeed something is missing” (1). By being
entirely blank, the papers in “Untitled” (Passport) give the effect of suggesting that
something is missing within them. Muñoz posits the feeling of something missing as
queer in that it rejects the present world and suggests movement towards another. This is
how Fleischmann interprets the blankness of the “Untitled” (Passport) when they write,
“The uninscribed, like Gonzalez-Torres says, is a site of change” (64). Blankness
suggests endless possibilities for change. The blankness of the sheets of paper in
“Untitled” (Passport) is queer in its suggestion that there is something missing and that
there is a possibility of moving towards change.
When discussing their resistance to the word “queer” to describe their identity,
Fleischmann alludes to Gonzalez-Torres’s piece, writing, “I would like to be uninscribed
by language, like an uninscribed piece of paper” (64). Fleischmann sees queer value in
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the blankness of “Untitled” (Passport) in refusing language and employs blankness as a
formal element in Time to maintain the ineffability of queerness beyond the use of
language. Most notably, Fleischmann includes an entirely blank page, front and back, on
pages 146 and 147. Though a blank page could easily be overlooked or merely regarded
as a transition marker, Fleischmann’s explicit interest in Gonzalez-Torres’s uninscribed
page draws attention to this page. I recognize it as a purposefully queer formal element
that represents the impossibility of writing about queerness merely through words,
particularly in light of the queer potential Fleischmann sees in Gonzalez-Torres’s blank
page.

The blank page in Time follows the final paragraph of the prose section, in which
Fleischmann writes that the story is “a story of bodies that are different, of people who
fuck up and make each other happy and then die. Where everything is impossible and so
we try to make it real. Where it’s spring, and the season of ice has passed” (144).
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Fleischmann suggests that these lines lend themselves to be followed by words, as earlier
in Time they write about a project they are working on “about Felix Gonzalez-Torres, ice,
and sex. Its opening line is, ‘It is spring, and the season of ice has passed,’” which also
serves as the final line of the paragraph before the blank page (40). By following this
repeated line at the end of Time with a blank page, Fleischmann suggests the possibility
of a book without words as perhaps the only way to sufficiently capture the impossibility
of writing about queerness and identity.
What follows this blank page is five pages on the topic of ice, in which
Fleischmann introduces another use of blank space. Each page contains a floating
paragraph framed by ellipses that do not feed directly into one another and are thus
incomplete, inserting blank spaces both between the paragraphs and above and below
them. The form Fleischmann uses to write about ice emphasizes the difficulty of
describing the substance in words. Like their recognition of the impossibility of language
for capturing queerness, Fleischman writes that they also “can’t fix in language” the
beauty of ice (29). I read ice in Time as an analogy to queerness, subtle evidence for
which appears throughout the text. Fleischmann’s use of blank space to write about ice
emphasizes the necessity of also using blank space to write about gender and sexuality.
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Content and form reflect one another in the way Fleischmann writes about ice. At
the beginning of Time, they explain that for a period of time they wrote about ice every
day and that “Getting close to ice made it easier to get my prose close to ice” (20). They
would observe ice closely and attempt to write about it in a form that reflected what they
saw, an attempt illustrated in the final five pages of Time. They describe the unstable
form of ice as “a disarray of fissures and air,” something that moves “directly from solid
to gas,” and is “split with tendrils of crack” (147, 149, and 150). By writing about ice in
paragraphs that have no definitive start or finish and are surrounded by blank space,
Fleischmann emphasizes the instability in fissures and cracks of the ice they describe.
The form of these final pages also emphasizes the insufficiency of language in being able
to entirely capture the ice.
Fleischmann subtly draws the connection between ice and queerness and the
difficulty of capturing both in language multiple times in Time. While sitting next to Lake
Michigan, trying to capture in their writing the way ice operates, Fleischmann writes,
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“The lake does not conform to my expectations of motion or fit its shapes to the rise and
fall of temperature” (89). These descriptions suggest incompletion and the difficulty of
capturing this substance in words that is reflected in the incomplete and indefinable form
of the final pages about ice. Fleischmann’s description of the ice on Lake Michigan
echoes their thoughts on their own transitioning body, when they write, “I can’t tell
whether I am conforming to fill a shape or drawing its boundaries” (9). They use the
words “conform” and “shape” to write about both ice and their transitioning body,
thereby drawing a connection between the two and furthering the analogy of ice to
queerness. Fleischmann more explicitly connects ice to queerness when they equate it to
their queer relationship with a person named Simon, telling him, “‘You know that I’m
talking about you when I talk about the ice’” (32). Though this is the only explicit
mention in the book of this connection, it confirms the distinct parallel between the
insufficiency of words to describe ice as well as queerness. This insufficiency of
language to describe ice, and subsequently queerness, is represented through the blank
space surrounding the paragraphs on ice at the end of the book.
Fleischmann more directly represents the insufficiency of language in describing
their queer relationship to Simon in the lineated sections of Time. These distinctive
sections interrupt the prose paragraphs of the book repeatedly throughout and are one of
the most visually striking formal elements of Time. The first time Fleischmann moves
into this form, they explain it as a way to work through their relationship with Simon,
someone they introduce as a “friend,” but write that this is “a word that reduced our odd
joining to something less than what it was”—a queer relationship for which there are not
words to describe (3). Simon, Fleischmann writes, made them “buzz with the anticipation
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of falling asleep all day” and the extra white space in these lineated sections is, according
to the author, “room for that buzzing along my words” (3). When words are not enough
to describe Fleischmann’s relationship to Simon, they turn to the formal element of blank
space to communicate the experience of this queer relationship.

Both Nelson and Fleischmann use blank space capaciously to queer their texts and
represent the insufficiency of language in writing about queerness. The blank spaces in
The Argonauts are consistent, breaking up the small chunks of text that make up the
book. Blank space notably often follows the unanswered questions that she poses about
queerness, and therefore emphasize their unanswerability, maintaining the necessary
ineffability of queerness. Fleischmann formally uses blank space in a variety of ways
throughout Time, but also to the same ends of writing about queerness beyond the use of
language. The nonnormative use of blank space in both texts is formally queer.
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Incomplete Integration of Outside Texts
A third element of collage form that Nelson and Fleischmann use queerly is the
incomplete integration of outside texts. Formally, both writers incompletely integrate the
outside texts into their primary works, which is queer in its deviation from normative
citation form. Queering their integration of outside texts allows the writers to express
queerness beyond the use of language. Nelson assembles The Argonauts from quotations
from a wide variety of other thinkers, whereas Fleischmann collages other projects of
their own in Time. Both writers’ amalgamation of outside sources is an element of their
work of low theory, which Halberstam describes as “Assembled from eccentric texts and
examples and that refuses to confirm the hierarchies of knowing that maintain the high in
high theory” (16). The assemblage of eccentric texts and subsequent production of low
theory in The Argonauts and Time queers the texts as it deviates from normative methods
of knowledge which maintain a binary between high and low culture or one particular
literary style. By being integrated incompletely into the texts, the formal integration of
outside texts in The Argonauts and Time allows for the irresolution that is central to both
queerness and the collage form. As Shields writes, “Collage is a demonstration of the
many becoming the one, with the one never fully resolved because of the many that
continue to impinge upon it” (112). It is through incompletely integrating their outside
sources that Nelson and Fleischmann are able to emphasize and maintain the irresolution
that is necessary for writing about queerness indirectly and thus in a queer form.
Nelson constructs The Argonauts as collage form from a collection of outside
texts that she places in conversation with her own original writing. Nelson quotes a vast
range of people, including the psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott, the contemporary singer
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Mary Lambert, the cultural theorist Judith Butler, and Nelson’s partner Harry, to only
name a few. This amalgamation of references from critical theory to pop culture to
personal life speaks to Halberstam’s low theory as an alternative, or queer, method of
knowledge making. Most of the sources Nelson pulls from are about queerness, or she at
least uses them to buttress her ideas on queerness. Nelson emphasizes the irresolution
necessary for low theory and writing about queerness through the way she formally
integrates the outside sources.
Nelson italicizes quotes and places the last name of the writer next to the quote in
the margin, integrating them into her text in an untraditional way. The fragmentary
quotes are integrated seamlessly into Nelson’s own writing, such as when she writes,
“Yet rather than fade away with the rise of queer parenthood of all stripes, the tired
binary that places femininity, reproduction, and normativity on one side and masculinity,
sexuality, and queer resistance on the other has lately reached a kind of apotheosis, often
posing as a last, desperate stand against homo- and heteronormativity, both” (75). By
putting most of the quotes in italics rather than quotation marks, she integrates them more
seamlessly into her own words, suggesting that there is no hierarchy to the works and
therefore doing the queer work of low theory.
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This seamlessness is also achieved through Nelson’s avoidance of using full intext citations or footnotes. In the margin next to this sentence on queer parenthood is
merely the name “Fraiman,” the extent of the attribution for the italicized quote. The
Argonauts notably lacks a bibliography, and so Nelson’s minimal in-text citations
emphasizes the incompletion that is necessary when writing about queerness. Nelson’s
formal use of quotations raises more questions than answers (what text is this from? What
year was it written? Does Nelson agree with the quote?). The incomplete integration of
outside texts thus contributes to The Argonauts work of doing low theory and is queer,
allowing Nelson to write indirectly about queerness beyond the use of language.
Fleischmann also emphasizes the irresolution necessary when writing indirectly
about queerness through their incomplete citations of outside texts, but unlike Nelson, the
outside texts they use are other projects of their own. While Fleischmann draws from a
few sources like the letters of Gonzalez-Torres and The Ice Museum: In Search of the
Lost Land of Thule (2006) by Joanna Kavenna, it is through their use of their own writing
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from outside materials that they create a collage form and emphasize irresolution about
queerness. They include two of their own pieces within their text that seem to not be part
of the original text, both due to their slightly smaller font and what Fleischmann says
about them within Time.
The aforementioned lineated sections that differ from the rest of the book both in
their use of blank space and in their content are part of one outside text that Fleischmann
incorporates into Time. While there is some overlap in the people and topics mentioned in
the lineated sections and the rest of the book, these sections are particularly focused on
the artist Felix Gonzalez-Torres and Fleischmann’s relationship to Simon and take place
in a different period of time than the rest of the book. There are multiple moments within
Time that Fleischmann suggests that the lineated sections are part of another project that
they are working on. At the beginning of Time, Fleischmann refers to this project when
they write, “I scrunch up into my laptop and open the thing I’m writing, a project I began
in the erotic vibrations of my friendship with Simon several years ago” (3). What quickly
follows is the first lineated section that deals with Fleischmann’s friendship to Simon,
suggesting that this is an excerpt of a larger project that is separate from Time.
Fleischmann also writes later in a more typical prose paragraph that they are working on
“a book about Felix Gonzalez-Torres, ice, and sex” (40). I read this as a description of the
project from which the lineated sections are from, as they are also primarily about these
topics. Fleischmann thus separates the lineated sections from Time, suggesting that it is
part of a different project.
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The project from which the lineated sections are drawn is incomplete and
disjointed within Time, opening up more questions than answers and allowing for the
indirectness that is necessary when writing about queerness and creating low theory. The
lineated sections do not come together to create a final product, and because they are
primarily about topics related to queerness, Fleischmann is thus able to maintain the
irresolution necessary for writing about this concept through their incomplete formal
integration of the project.
Formally different from these lineated sections but still dealing with queerness is
the account of the “Publick Universal Friend” which Fleischmann suddenly inserts into
the middle of the book from pages 71 to 86. A true story that Fleischmann researched, it
is an account of someone from the 1700s who was gender non-conforming.
Fleischmann’s tale is very detailed, devoid of the voice present in the rest of the book,
and dry in style. These stylistic elements separate this section starkly from the rest of
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Time, as does Fleischmann’s decision to put it in a slightly smaller font, like the lineated
sections. This story seems jarring and out of place in Time and is only connected to the
rest of the book in its interest in non-normative gender. Fleischmann’s only
acknowledgement of the story of the Publick Universal Friend in the rest of Time is in the
sentence after the story when they write, “I try to tell a girl at a trans-centric queer party
in Chicago about the Publick Universal Friend but she seems either bored or offended, I
can’t tell which” (86). This does not explain why they decided to include the entire story
written as they did. By opening up more questions than answers with their inclusion of
this story and its starkly different formal and stylistic elements, Fleischmann is doing the
work of low theory and emphasizing the irresolution necessary particularly for writing
about queerness.
Both The Argonauts and Time are formed from a disparate collection of texts, the
former of outside works and the latter of other works by the author. The eccentricity of
the texts contributes to the writers’ production of low theory, and also allows for
questions and irresolution necessary for writing about queerness within capturing its
ineffability. Both writers use formal elements to emphasize the foreignness of the outside
texts; Nelson puts quotations in italics and Fleischmann puts the excerpts of their other
projects in a smaller font and lineated differently from the rest of the book. In both books,
questions remain about the outside texts which makes their integration queer. Nelson’s
are not fully cited as she only provides the last time of the author in the margins next to
their quote and refrains from including a bibliography. And though Fleischmann suggests
that their outside works are part of different projects, they do not fully explain where they
are from or include them in their entirety. Nelson and Fleischmann’s formal use of
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outside texts, whether it be others’ or their own, opens up questions, allows for
irresolution, and deals with queerness indirectly.
Conclusion
When language is not enough to write about queerness, or risks being injurious to
the concept in its attempt to capture its ineffability, as we understand through the work of
Morrison, Butler, and Muñoz, Nelson and Fleischmann turn to queering the formal
elements of their books to write indirectly about queerness. By writing in the collage
form and using the elements of blank space, non-linearity, and the incomplete integration
of outside texts, Nelson and Fleischmann queer the normative forms of the genres they
are working in—memoir and the essay, respectively. Queering the form of their books
allows Nelson and Fleischmann write indirectly about queerness without relying fully on
language and thus avoiding capturing the concept’s necessary ineffability. Queering the
form also helps Nelson and Fleischmann to achieve another goal of their texts, which I
will explore in my next chapter. Both writers express a desire to invoke queer bodily
experience through their writing, which I will argue the queer form allows them to do.
Through form, the writers affirm the realness of bodies that are at risk of being erased
without capturing the ineffability of the bodies’ queerness.
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Chapter III: “Success in Circuit Lies”
Maggie Nelson and T Fleischmann both express a desire to represent the real in
their books. For both writers, “realness” is an affirmation of bodily existence. The types
of bodies that they attempt to represent in their books are nonnormative and queer, and
thus perpetually at risk of cultural erasure, making the affirmation of their realness
particularly important. In this chapter, I acknowledge that Judith Butler explains that
expressing one’s experience through language is one way to avoid this erasure. But, as I
have argued, both Nelson and Fleischmann recognize the danger in relying on language
to write about queerness as words risk damaging the ineffability of the concept. This
raises a paradox for Nelson and Fleischmann’s intentions for their books to represent the
realness of queer bodies. I argue that the writers are successful in affirming their realness
of the queer bodies they write about through the queer form of their books.
By refusing genre categories for their books and writing non-linearly, Nelson and
Fleischmann invoke nonnormative bodies through the queer form of their books. In doing
so, they prove that even that which cannot be named is still real. Finally, I recognize that
both writers’ desire to affirm their own realness is coupled with a desire to extend this
sense of realness to others, which I read as an act of queer collectivity. I argue that it is
through the formal elements of collage that I analyzed in chapter two that they are able to
invite others into their works. Through the formal elements that I analyzed in chapter
two, Nelson and Fleischmann write about queerness in a “slant” way. Or, to use another
word Emily Dickinson poses in the second line of her poem, they approach queerness
circuitously, moving around the concept rather than pinning it down. In this chapter, I
will argue that, despite moving away from relying on language, both Nelson and
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Fleischmann succeed in their goal of affirming the realness of the bodies they write about
through queer form. This is important because the queer bodies they invoke in their
works of literature are at risk of being culturally erased.
Realness
In a 2013 interview in Gulf Coast, Nelson remarks that all of her work is linked
by “an intense and ongoing desire to see and say, to document, to observe, to research, to
bear witness, to articulate elements of the so-called ‘real’” (Nelson, “The ‘f-word’:
fragment and the futility of genre classification). In The Argonauts, Nelson describes her
idea of realness as heavily inspired by the work of early twentieth-century psychologist
D.W. Winnicott, a concept that she says he “describes as the collected, primary sensation
of aliveness, ‘the aliveness of the body tissues and working of body-functions, including
the heart’s action and breathing’” (14). The realness that Nelson is so compelled to
document in her work is bodily. It is not a claiming of identity, as she writes, “Any fixed
claim on realness, especially when it is tied to an identity, also has a finger in psychosis,”
which she claims Winnicott’s idea of realness departs from (14). According to Nelson,
Winnicott describes feeling real as “a sensation that spreads,” something mutable and
unfixed, like the queerness that Nelson writes about (14). One cannot fix a claim on
realness with an identity term because it does not allow for the inevitable shifting of
identity and elements of realness beyond the naming of a category. Feeling real,
according to Nelson, is not claiming an identity category or finding a word to describe
oneself, but rather turning one’s attention to bodily experience as a collection of senses
and feelings.
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Fleischmann is slightly less explicit about their investment in realness than
Nelson, but they express the desire for their writing to affirm the realness of their own
bodily, sensory experience. Fleischmann’s investment in realness is related to the types of
bodies they write about: queer, nonnormative, not widely represented in culture, and thus
particularly important to document. Introducing a paragraph about bodily, sensory
experience, Fleischmann asks, “Isn’t it strange, to grow up in a culture where your own
experience is so completely erased that you don’t even realize you’re possible until your
early twenties?” (87). Fleischmann suggests that this sense of erasure was their
experience as a self-identified trans person with nonnormative relationships and ways of
being in the world. Not seeing representations of experiences like theirs in culture made
them unaware of their own realness. They suggest that they want their writing to resist
this erasure, as they immediately follow this question with the passage:
“If I am adding myself to the crowd of people who write, I would like it
sometimes to be me when I am warm. I would like people to know that I am
happy, sometimes. Like after I eat a weed brownie, and the warm feeling seems to
come up inside and fill me, the warmth even exceeding me, a gooey brownie
feeling of who I am. A warm person holding someone and feeling entirely present
in that moment” (87-88).
They use the feeling of eating a weed brownie, a sensory experience of “warmth,” as a
feeling of “who I am,” tracing a relationship between sensory experience and the
affirmation of their own real existence. By immediately following their question about
erasure with descriptions of bodily experience in the same paragraph, Fleischmann
establishes a direct connection between their desire for their nonnormative existence to be
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represented and the power in writing to do so. The representation they desire looks like a
description of bodily experience, like feeling warm. Writing Time is a way for them to
document nonnormative bodies and experiences through formally nonnormative writing.
Nelson and Fleischmann’s desire to express the realness of the nonnormative
bodies they write about raises a paradox for their books in which, as I discuss in chapter
one, both writers express a desire to move away from language. Language seems to be
the most obvious way through which the writer would assert their realness in the work—
using words to describe themselves. While Butler writes about the injurious power of
language in Excitable Speech, she also acknowledges its power to sustain and affirm the
realness of a body, particularly those not widely represented. Butler writes, “Language
sustains the body not by bringing it into being or feeding it in a literal way; rather it is by
being interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the body
first becomes possible” (5). Butler recognizes that language can affirm the existence of a
body considering that we are “linguistic beings, beings who require language in order to
be” (1). Affirming the existence of the queer bodies that they write about is a mission
central to both Nelson and Fleischmann’s works, though they also both recognize the
limits of language in doing so.
While both Nelson and Fleischmann think that language is more injurious for
describing queerness, they do acknowledge its sustaining power. Nelson writes that it can
be impossible for some to claim identity terms, but she also acknowledges that “Some
people find pleasure in aligning themselves with an identity” (Nelson 14-15). And even
though Fleischmann writes now that it is unpleasant for them to claim identity terms for
gender and sexuality, they write, “I used to insist on my identities, that I was a bisexual
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boy, or genderqueer, or a queer” (64). While they don’t explain exactly why they used
these words to identify themselves, it was likely because, as Butler articulates, we require
“language to be.” However, Nelson still maintains her stance that words are not enough
to write about queerness; likewise, Fleischmann still insists on keeping their gender and
sex life “uninscribed by language.” How, then, are they able to represent the queer body,
which is so often at risk of being erased, if not through relying on language and while still
maintaining the ineffability of queerness? To think about this question, I turn to writing
on queer abstract art and then return to the formal elements of The Argonauts and Time.
The queer body in abstract visual art
This question of invoking the queer body indirectly beyond the use of language is
one that some contemporary abstract artists wrestle with in their work. Writing on queer
abstract art has helped me think about invoking the body beyond the use of language. The
significant difference between visual art and text is the medium; visual art can refuse
language entirely, whereas text is still necessarily constructed from it. However, both
have the potential for invoking the queer body without explicitly representing it. In the
introduction to a roundtable discussion called “Queer Abstraction,” Ashton Cooper
writes:
“a new generation of queer, genderqueer, and transgender artists are taking up
abstraction to deal with issues of gender—and, in this case, to talk about the body
without representing or signifying it explicitly. In his recent research, art historian
David J. Getsy has asked, ‘What happens when the body is invoked but not
imaged?’ In such a mode of image making, abstract art exceeds the constraints of
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binary logic; the body is posited as a catalog of sensory experiences and a place of
flux” (286).
Like Nelson and Fleischmann, these artists that Cooper writes about want to represent the
body, and particularly the queer body, through its sensory experiences. They want to
invoke the body but not explicitly depict it. It is through the form of their work that
abstract artists are able to do this, as Cooper explains, “the formal qualities of their work
plunge us into indeterminacy, making us step outside prevailing modes of understanding
both selfhood and language” (286). It is also the formal qualities of Nelson and
Fleischmann’s textual work that allows them to invoke the queer body while not fully
depicting it, maintaining the indeterminacy and irresolution necessary to queerness.
As I’ve already introduced, one abstract artist who represents the queer body
implicitly is Felix Gonzalez-Torres, whose work Fleischmann writes about extensively in
Time. As curator Nancy Spector writes, “The body is everywhere present in GonzalezTorres’s work, yet it is rarely visible as such” (140). Fleischmann is deeply interested in
this aspect of Gonzalez-Torres’s art, which informs their own attempts to invoke the body
in their writing. One Gonzalez-Torres piece that Fleischmann interprets as particularly
implicitly representative of the body is a pair of mirrors, about which they write, “In a
practice that suggests bodies spilled and gestured toward, “Untitled” (Orpheus, Twice)
also seems to me one of the most embodied works. / Maybe that crude fact, that it is my
own self filling that mirror, makes it so” (53). Even the reflection of the viewer’s body
cannot be contained or captured in this piece, meaning that the artwork does not
explicitly represent the body, but rather invokes it. Fleischmann recognizes this, writing,
“The mirrors, then, are a rare instance where the body is mimetic, even in motion” (53).
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A body in motion has queer connotations, as Muñoz theorizes queerness as “a longing
that propels us onward,” something which necessitates movement towards a different
place (1). Gonzalez-Torres’s “Untitled” Orpheus invokes the body but queerly does not
explicitly represent it.
Spector also suggests other queer implications of Gonzalez-Torres’s refusal to
represent the body explicitly: “By deemphasizing the figurative, he seeks to encourage a
more open-ended reading of the work, one that does not presume a specific gender
configuration or sexual orientation” (Spector 144). This movement away from identity
markers in Gonzalez-Torres’s work maintains the ineffability of queerness that Butler
and Muñoz write about. Fleischmann recognizes this aspect of Gonzalez-Torres’s work
as well, writing, “A body absent is a body that cannot be set, cannot be anchored in place
and subjected to the process by which we racialize, gender, assess through our senses,”
maintaining its queer potential in its ineffability (53).
Queer abstract art and analysis on the subject illuminate the possibility of
invoking the queer body beyond the use of written language, but Nelson and Fleischmann
aren’t visual artists. They are writers, but they are writers who are interested in moving
away from language towards an emphasis on form. How, then, do Nelson and
Fleischmann represent the queer body through the form of their books? By answering this
question, we can see how writers can move beyond language to use form to not only
write about queerness, but also invoke the queer body and affirm its realness.
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“The book is a body in a form”
The queer form of their books invokes the queer bodies that Nelson and
Fleischmann write about. In his essay “Genre-Queer” in Bending Genre, Kazim Ali
argues that “the book is a body in a form” (36). As suggested by the essay’s title, Ali
writes about queer bodies in particular. He sees the parallel between the book and the
body stemming from the parallel between genre and gender as he writes, “if we want to
think about genre like gender it means we are thinking of the book as a body” (33).
Several of the writers in Bending Genre acknowledge the shared etymology of genre and
gender1 . Both concepts categorize and sometimes constrain what they categorize, as Ali
writes, “gender and genre derive from the same classifying, categorizing impulse—the
impulsive not to invent but to consume, commodify, own” (29). Books that avoid this
categorizing impulse, Ali writes, are works “whose genre is unto themselves, whose
whole texts live with bodies ungenred as genderqueer bodies, take their own gender unto
themselves, neither accepting one category nor another” (Ali 36). The Argonauts and
Time are examples of these kinds of books that Ali writes about, as they avoid genre
categories due in part to their queer formal elements. By being in collage form, The
Argonauts and Time borrow from multiple genres and don’t fit into any particular one.
The queer form of the books invokes the queer bodies that Nelson and Fleischmann want
to make real through their writing, while moving beyond language to do so.

1

Perhaps this relationship is emphasized to an excessive degree, as Fleischmann suggests in their essay in
the collection when they write, “the fact that genre an d gender share an etymology always remains
conveniently obvious” and multiple writers acknowledge this fact (“Ill-Fit the World” 50). However, it
remains helpful in terms of thinking about the way both concepts can categorize and constrain.
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Nelson avoids categorizing the genre of her books for similar reasons she avoids
using “queer” as an identity term. When Fleischmann asks Nelson if she considers herself
an essayist in the Essay Daily interview, she remarks that genre categories reign in the
possibilities of her writing, saying, “I don’t think about genre very much, though I get it
that a lot of people are these days. I think that, if I ever have the suspicion that a
particular conversation might inhibit or delimit my writing, I self-protectively steer away
from it, which is what I’ve ended up doing on this account.” While, according to the back
of the book, The Argonauts is classified as “memoir/criticism,” within the book, Nelson
expresses that this classification does not entirely fit, writing that sometimes she is “in
drag as a memoirist” (114). In this comment, she connects genre to gender as they both
are categories that one can take on but do not fully encompass the realness of what they
refer to.
The queer form of The Argonauts makes it hard to precisely fit into any genre
categories. While Nelson’s personal narrative of her relationship to Harry and her
pregnancy is memoiristic, by being told non-linearly it resists the typical linear structure
of a memoir. And the copious quotes from philosophers and writers throughout the text
give it the quality of criticism, but the incompleteness of the citations makes it fall
outside of typical academic criticism. By refusing genre categorization through the form
of her work, Nelson maintains the ineffability of The Argonauts’ genre, like the
queerness she writes about and the bodies she represents.
Fleischmann similarly evades strict genre categorization in Time in a way that is
related to queerness. The category of “an essay” is stamped on the cover of Time, and
Fleischmann embraces the term, but this move also resists genre categorization. In the
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introduction to Body Forms, they argue that “the essay is exciting because of its
hybridity, its slipping among genres” (vi). “The essay” might seem like a category, but to
Fleischmann it is one that is capacious and represents a resistance to categorization.
Fleischmann also draws a direct connection between the essay form and queerness when
they write, “Queerness has been useful to me in its ability to never land, to divorce itself
from the ideas to which we attach it and to complicate itself further as it explores. Essays
are similarly weird” (vi). Their interest in genre and queerness is ultimately rooted in the
project of invoking the queer body as they conclude the introduction by writing, “And
that, the discord and the harmony, the promiscuity of reading and the return to the body
that we celebrate and resist, is the goal of this project. Placing queerness and the essay
together, two weird things that shift, and how they then shift more, again” (viii). By
calling Time “an essay,” Fleischmann resists constraining genre categories, reflecting the
nonnormative bodies that it represents that also avoid categorization.
Both Nelson and Fleischmann write about queer bodies as non-linear. By writing
their books in the non-linear form that I described and analyzed in chapter two, the
writers invoke the queer bodies they want to represent without describing them explicitly.
Fleischmann argues that the body, and particular the transitioning body, is non-linear:
“I distrust linearity, but bodies can seem like one of the only linear things—age,
getting bigger and then smaller, death. Another reason to appreciate the
transitioning body, which ages backward, every person seeming to become
younger, with or without hormones. It’s a good reminder that the body was never
linear in the first place” (59).
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While bodies operating within the “straight time” that Halberstam and Muñoz write about
can be regarded as linear, the transitioning body steps out of that linearity. Fleischmann is
pointing to the idea that people who transition might not experience time in the same way
as cisgender people do because, for one, the time when they were not out as trans might
not count to them as time spent as who they really are. In “The Old-School Transsexual
and the Working-Class Drag Queen,” Grace Lavery explains, writing that the
“temporality of the closet” “can feel in retrospect both like ‘dead time,’ the cryogenetic
time of waiting.” For trans people, the cisnormative idea of time as progressing linearly
may not apply to their experience of temporality.
Nelson writes about Harry’s transition in a way that presents another way of
thinking about how the transitioning queer body can disrupt linear temporality. She
brings into question another identity term—trans—when she writes, “‘trans’ may work
well enough as shorthand, but the quickly developing mainstream narrative it evokes
(‘born in the wrong body,’ necessitating an orthopedic pilgrimage between two fixed
destinations) is useless for some,” including Harry who says, “I’m not on my way
anywhere” (52-53). For Harry, transitioning is marked by a lack of forward movement
from one point to the next, therefore disrupting linearity.
Nelson also describes her pregnancy, the other central bodily experience in The
Argonauts, as a non-linear bodily experience. Nelson suggests that pregnancy is queer
when she asks, “Is there something inherently queer about pregnancy itself, insofar as it
profoundly alters one’s ‘normal’ state, and occasions a radical intimacy with—and
radical alienation from—one’s body?” (13). Nelson emphasizes the queerness of the
bodily experience of pregnancy by describing it as non-linear when she writes, as she is
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giving birth to her son Iggy at the very end of the book, “If all goes well, the baby will
make it out alive, and so will you. Nonetheless, you will have touched death along the
way” (Nelson 134). In this collapse of new life and death, Nelson disrupts the notion of a
linear bodily experience making it instead somewhat cyclical. This collapse is starkly
emphasized in the form of the end of the book when Iggy’s birth scene is interwoven with
Harry’s writings on the death of his mother.
By writing the narratives of their books in a non-linear, queer form, Nelson and
Fleischmann represent the non-linearity of the queer bodily experiences that they write
about and affirm the realness of the queer bodies that are at risk of being culturally
erased.
Queer Collectivity
For both Nelson and Fleischmann, their desire to affirm their own realness is
coupled with a desire to offer a sense of realness to others. This impulse is an example of
queer collectivity, an important element of Muñoz’s theory of queerness and specifically
queer futurity. To Muñoz, queerness’s potentiality “lingers and serves as a conduit for
knowing and feeling other people” (113). Muñoz argues that keeping queerness on the
horizon and critiquing the present order of things is a collective effort. He explains:
“From shared critical dissatisfaction we arrive at collective potentiality” (189). The
collage form, and particularly the queer elements of blank space and incomplete
integration of outside texts in The Argonauts and Time engage the reader and establish a
sense of queer collectivity in the reading experience. These formal elements require the
reader to pause and be more active in connecting the disparate elements, offering them a
sense of agency in involving them in the reading process and inviting them to insert their
72

own experiences. Nelson and Fleischmann are thus able to extend this feeling of realness
to their readers in an effort towards queer collectivity.
In Nelson’s celebration of Winnicott’s sensory-centered idea of realness, she
writes not only that “One can aspire to feel real,” but also that “one can help others to feel
real” (14). Helping others to feel real is not giving them identity markers to attach to
themselves, as Nelson earlier argues that realness is not about identity when she writes,
“Any fixed claim on realness, especially when it is tied to an identity, also has a finger in
psychosis,” but rather affirming their own bodily experience (14).
Fleischmann is also interested in extending their own feeling of realness to others
as, following their description of the warm, sensory, bodily experience they want their
writing to invoke, they ask, “Can this offer something? To someone who is not me?” (8788). These questions close their paragraph that starts with the recognition that they spent
years of life thinking that their existence was not possible because their experience was
not represented in culture. Fleischmann want to extend their own feeling of realness that
they have finally discovered through their writing to others in an act of queer collectivity.
The formal elements of collage including blank space and the incomplete
integration of outside texts invite others into the text by encouraging active reader
involvement. In his essay “Text Adventure,” Ander Monson encourages writers to think
about the involvement of the reader, something which is particularly relevant to the
collage form when he writes, “Collage starts getting us there, with the reader’s nontrivial
effort required to make connections, to elide white space and fragment” (89-90). Monson
argues that the collage form, with its significant use of blank space and disconnected
fragments, encourages readers to be more actively engaged in connected these fragments
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despite the white space. However, as I have presented the value in the formal possibilities
of white space and non-linear fragments in The Argonauts and Time, I believe that the
reader’s engagement comes through in pausing and dwelling on these formal elements.
Monson is helpful, however, in bringing up to elements of collage form which I see as
holding the most significant possibilities for reader engagement that I will explore
further.
Blank space brings the reader in by requiring a more active and collective reading
experience. In his book Reality Hunger, itself an example of collage form, David Shields
writes, “Any opportunity that a writer has to engage the reader intimately in the act of
creating the text is an opportunity to grab on to. White space does that.” (122). Shields
suggests the potential for collectivity in blank space in that it engages the reader
“intimately.” White space can create a relationship between the writer and the reader that,
in the case of The Argonauts and Time, is an example of queer collectivity. The
consistent blank spaces that break up Nelson’s paragraphs give the reader a chance to ask
questions, to dwell on what has gone unanswered, and to make their own connections
between fragments of text separated by space. The entirely blank page at the end of Time
encourages the reader to pause and to read meaning into the page. Blank space breaks up
the text and extends to the reader a chance to reflect.
Nelson and Fleischmann’s incomplete integration of outside texts that I analyzed
in chapter two also encourage the reader to be actively engaged in reading the text. In
Nelson’s incomplete citations and Fleischmann’s fragmented, disjointed excerpts of their
own writing, the writers open up more questions for readers about their texts. In her
analysis of Reality Hunger in the essay “Positively Negative,” Dinty Moore explains how
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incorporating outside texts incompletely invites reader involvement, writing, “Shields
further complicates his work, and demands further reader participation, by refusing to
acknowledge his sources of the quotes” (184). This holds true for Nelson and
Fleischmann’s works as well. Nelson and Fleischmann both fail to include the full
sources of their outside texts, whether authored by others, in the case of Nelson, or
themselves, in the case of Fleischmann. In The Argonauts, this encourages readers to do
their own research to discover what sources the quotes are from. And while reading Time,
readers must make their own assumptions about the other projects that Fleischmann
includes.
Conclusion
Nelson and Fleischmann express similar goals of their books: to affirm the
realness of the queer bodies they write about and to extend this sense of realness to
others. It is through the queer form of their books that they are able to do both of these
things. While queer form helps the writers to move beyond language to write about
queerness without capturing its ineffability, as I argued in chapter two, it also allows
them to successfully achieve these additional goals of their works. The queer form of the
books eschews genre categorization and emphasizes that the queer bodies that Nelson and
Fleischmann write about also cannot be categorized. Additionally, Nelson and
Fleischmann describe the bodies they write about as non-linear and reflect this in the nonlinear form of their books. The queer form invokes the queer bodies beyond the use of
language, thus avoiding attempting to injuriously capture queerness’s ineffability.
The queer form of The Argonauts and Time also extends a sense of realness to
others as it actively engages the reader, making them aware of their own existence in the
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reading experience. By engaging the reader particularly through blank space and the
incomplete integration of outside texts, Nelson and Fleischmann create a sense of queer
collectivity in their texts.
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Conclusion
Ironically, I want to linearly conclude this study by turning to the final lines of
The Argonauts and Time Is the Thing a Body Moves Through which intriguingly closely
resonate with one another and speak to the themes that I have analyzed throughout this
project. Both lines are queer in content and form and return to a focus on the bodily and
the collective, reflecting what I’ve pointed out about the rest of the books throughout this
study.
Nelson concludes The Argonauts by responding to a quote from Leo Bersani and
Adam Phillips’ book Intimacies that reads, “the joke of all evolution is that it is a
teleology without a point, that we, like all animals, are a project that issues in nothing”
(qtd. in Nelson 143). In response, Nelson asks, “But is there really such a thing as
nothing, as nothingness?” Like she has with her questions all throughout the book, she
allows this question to remain unresolved, following with, “I don’t know.” She allows for
the irresolution necessary for writing about queerness without capturing its ineffability.
Nelson shares what she does know, however, in a metered, rhyming line of poetry
as the final line of the book, writing, “I know we’re still here, who knows for how long,
ablaze with our care, its ongoing song” (143). In its content this final sentence is queer
within Butler and Muñoz’s framing of queerness as something that must be unable to be
captured in the present but used to move constantly forwards into the future to maintain
its political potential. Nelson refers to the song as “ongoing”; something which carries us
forever into the future, or as long as we survive, like Butler’s description of queerness as
something that must be “redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the
direction of urgent and expanding political purposes” and Muñoz’s description of the
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concept as something which “propels us onward” (“Critically Queer” 19; 1). Formally,
this line is queer because it deviates on the sentence level from the normative prose of the
rest of the book. In its content and form, this final sentence emphasizes the irresolution
and ever-changing nature of the ineffable queerness that Nelson writes about throughout
The Argonauts.
The final line of Time also emphasizes irresolution, particularly through its form.
Coincidentally, like Nelson’s final line, the final line of Time also refers to song as, at the
end of the final floating paragraph about ice, Fleischman writes, “Let’s sing…” (151).
The line’s ellipses trail off into the remaining white space of the page and suggest a
relentless movement towards the future that can never be resolved, like Muñoz’s theory
of queerness as something which “propels us onward” relentlessly towards the horizon
that we may never reach (1).
And now, of course, I must address the most glaring question that arises when
comparing these two final lines: Why do both the writers refer to song, a subject that
neither one has addressed in their book up until this point? One theory I have is that song
returns the focus to the bodily, a primary intention of the books as I explained in chapter
three. Singing is a sensory experience that affirms the realness of our bodies, which
Nelson and Fleischmann want their books to do as well. Additionally, the writers’
invocation of song is an invocation of the queer collectivity that they have been building
throughout their books through their formal elements that actively engage the reader.
Nelson uses the first-person plural to remind us that “we are still here” with “our care”
and Fleischmann makes the act of singing collectivity by using “Let’s.” In both final
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sentences, Nelson and Fleischmann bring the reader into their relentless, queer, songfilled movement towards the future.
As a reader searching for expansive ideas about queerness told in a queer form,
The Argonauts and Time Is the Thing a Body Moves Through offer so much to me, as
Nelson and Fleischmann wish. They offer a legitimation of maintaining queerness as
something ineffable. They offer an allowance of paradox in their recognition that words
are insufficient for writing about queerness but continuing to write about the concept
anyway. They offer an affirmation of the realness of the queer body. And finally, they
offer a sense of queer collectivity in the reading experience. In these offerings, The
Argonauts and Time bring us towards queerness without ever quite capturing it and that
is, precisely, what makes them queer.
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